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Conceptualizing Complicity
in Alien Tort Cases
CHIMtNE

I.

KEITNER*

INTRODUCTION

Judges, litigants, and scholars increasingly confront challenges raised
by cases involving multiple and overlapping legal orders. Claims brought
under the Alien Tort Statute' ("ATS") exemplify these challenges,
because they call on U.S. courts to provide domestic remedies for
international wrongs. The ATS provides federal courts' with subject

matter jurisdiction over aliens' claims for certain international law
violations that sound in tort.' Although

ATS cases have become

* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. My sincere
thanks to those who have offered feedback on this project, including William Aceves. Susan Benesch,
Meg DeGuzman, William Dodge, David Gold, Kevin Jon Heller, Elizabeth Hillman, Evan Lee,
Richard Marcus, Kenneth Randall, Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Jonathan Schmidt, Marco Simons, Sonja
Starr, Cora True-Frost, and Jenia Iontcheva Turner. Thanks also to participants in the Hastings
Faculty Workshop, the JILSA 2oo8 Annual Conference, and the Law & Society Association 2oo8
Annual Meeting. Of course, these individuals are exempt from any attribution of responsibility for, or
endorsement of, my analysis.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2oo6). In this Article, I follow the United States Supreme Court in using the
term Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") instead of Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"). See, e.g., Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004). Both terms refer to the same provision.
2. I am concerned here only with claims brought under the ATS's grant of federal jurisdiction,
although many ATS plaintiffs bring pendent state law claims and many also file cases in state court.
See, e.g., THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGAL ADVOCACY I (forthcoming Dec. 2oo8) (on file with The Hastings Law
Journal) (referring to the use of arguments based on international human rights law in state courts as
an "underutilized opportunity"); cf. Chim~ne I. Keitner & Kenneth C. Randall, The Seventh Circuit
Again Finds Jurisdictionfor Private Remedies for Violations of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, ASIL INSIGHTS, May 16, 2007, http://asil.org/insights/2oo7/o5/insightso7o5l4.html
("[A]s federal case law progressively circumscribes the available causes of action under the ATS,
plaintiffs may seek to file international law claims in state courts as claims for municipal torts-the
very 'torts' that the First Congress sought to bring within federal jurisdiction because of their potential
implications for international affairs."). On the relationship between state and federal court
interpretations of customary international law in the ATS context see, for example, Ernest A. Young,
Federal Suits and General Laws: A Comment on Judge Fletcher's Reading of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 33, 36-37 (2OO7), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/o3/22/
young.pdf.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.").
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increasingly familiar to U.S. judges, fundamental questions persist about
what law applies to various aspects of ATS claims.4 How U.S. judges
analyze these questions, and what conclusions they reach, will affect the
continued availability of civil remedies in U.S. courts for certain
international law violations. These choices also carry broader
implications for the role of international law in U.S. courts, and for the
role of U.S. courts in enforcing international law.
A central unresolved question in ATS litigation is what standards
govern the liability of accomplices to international law violations, rather
than direct perpetrators of those violations. Judges and scholars have
reached, and continue to reach, divergent conclusions about how to
identify the applicable standards in ATS cases, leading to confusion in
the lower courts and persistent uncertainty for litigants.' Although the
United States Supreme Court reviewed the history and application of the
ATS in the 2004 case Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, that case did not involve
accomplice liability.6 The doctrinal question of what standards govern
accomplice liability continues to perplex courts,7 and has received
insufficient attention from scholars.
4. For example, a recent article by Doug Cassel, published as this Article was in its final stages,
"concludes with a call for clarification" of the law applicable to claims of corporate aiding and abetting
liability brought under the ATS. Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights
Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTs. 304, 304 (2008); see also In re
Sinaltrainal Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (stating that "there is a pressing need for
clarification of these issues").
5. For example, corporate litigation partner Jonathan Drimmer recently characterized aiding
and abetting liability under the ATS as "a confused regime defined by substantial uncertainty for
companies, their counsel, and their executive officers." Jonathan Drimmer, The Aiding and Abetting
Conundrum Under the Alien Tort ClaimsAct, LExIsNExIs EXPERT COMMENTARY, June 2oo8, at I.

6. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). For the record, I coauthored an amicus brief in
Sosa. Brief for the World Jewish Congress and the American Jewish Committee as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (Nos. 03-339, 03-485).

7. At the time of writing, the United States Supreme Court had been procedurally compelled to
deny review of a divided Second Circuit opinion involving accomplice liability. Khulumani v. Barclay
Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3 d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), affd sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S.
Ct. 2424 (2008) (affirming under 28 U.S.C. § 2109, with no precedential effect). Two other cases raising
this issue were awaiting oral argument on appeal. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy
Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), appeal docketed, No. 07-ooI6-cv (2d Cir. Jan. 3, 2007);
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 456 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y 2oo6), appeals docketed, Nos. o64800, 06-4876 (2d Cir. Oct. I8, 2006; 2d Cir. Oct. 23, 2006).
8. Exceptions include Cassel, supra note 4, at 317 (canvassing international law precedents but
not reaching a conclusion on the choice of law issue); Tarek F. Maasarani, Four Counts of Corporate
Complicity: Alternative Forms of Accomplice Liability Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 38 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 39 (20o6) (canvassing alternative theories of liability to aiding and abetting); Anthony
J. Sebok, Taking Tort Law Seriously in the Alien Tort Statute, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 871, 897 (2008)
(advocating a "global tort law" approach to the ATS in which federal courts identify the best rule from
among a range of domestic and foreign sources); Daniel Diskin, Note, The Historical and Modern
Foundationsfor Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, 47 ARIZ. L. REv. 805, 81O
(2oo5) (advocating the application of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876); Philip A. Scarborough,
Note, Rules of Decision for Issues Arising Under the Alien Tort Statute, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 457, 462
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The problem of accomplice liability most often arises in ATS cases
brought against corporations for their alleged complicity in international
law violations perpetrated by foreign governments, because corporations
rarely engage in conduct such as torture, rape, and summary execution
directly. As John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the U.N.
Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational
corporations and other business enterprises, reports: "Few legitimate
firms may ever directly commit acts that amount to international crimes.
But there is greater risk of their facing allegations of 'complicity' in such
crimes."9 The dilemma of articulating standards for accomplice liability is
bound to persist as plaintiffs continue to file ATS cases against corporate
defendants, and some of these proceed to trial. 1°
(advocating a federal common law approach that looks to well-developed state law).
9. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General,
Business and Human Rights: Mapping InternationalStandardsof Responsibility and Accountability for
Corporate Acts, 30, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35 (Feb. I9, 2007) (preparedby John Ruggie) [hereinafter
Business and Human Rights]; see also Eastman Kodak v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, IO9I (S.D. Fla.
1997) (stating that "the question is whether the ATCA makes a private actor liable in tort for
conspiring with state actors to violate the law of nations"). An unusual allegation of direct corporate
responsibility is the complaint in Estate of Himoud Saed Atban v. Blackwater USA, No. I:o7-cv-oi83 I
(D.D.C. filed Oct. I1, 2007), which alleges direct liability for extrajudicial killing and war crimes. See
also Complaint at 2, Ramchandra Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, No. 2:o8-cv-o5626 (C.D. Cal. filed
Aug. 27, 2008) (alleging torts including human trafficking in violation of international law). Earlier
cases establishing the accomplice liability of individuals, rather than corporations, include Cabello v.
Fernandez-Larios,402 F.3d 1148, 1158-59 (1Ith Cir. 2005), Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d I12, 114849 (E.D. Cal. 2004), and Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2002).
io.As of the time of writing, ATS cases against corporations included Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F.
Supp. 2d III6 (C.D. Cal. 2002), appeals docketed, Nos. 02-56256, 02-56390 (9th Cir. July 26, 2002; 9th
Cir. Aug. 15, 2002) (argued to en banc court on Oct. 11, 2007), Corrie v. Caterpillar,403 F. Supp. 2d
(2007)

1oi9 (W.D. Wash. 2005), appealdocketed, No. 05-36210 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2005) (dismissed Sept. 17,

2007; plaintiffs-appellants petitioned for rehearing en banc), and Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 134 (C.D. Cal. 2005), appeals docketed, Nos. 05-56056, 05-56175, 05-56178 (9th
Cir. July 21, 2005; 9th Cir. Aug 8, 2005: 9th Cir. Aug 8, 2005) (argued Apr. 19, 2007 and subsequently
withdrawn Aug. 23, 2007). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently decided two corporate ATS
cases. Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008);
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007). As indicated above, two corporate
ATS appeals were pending before the Second Circuit at the time of writing. See Presbyterian Church
of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), appeal docketed, No. 07-0016cv (2d Cir. Jan. 3, 2007); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 456 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y 2006),
appeals docketed, Nos. 06-4800, o6-4876 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2006; 2d Cir. Oct. 23, 2006). The first
corporate ATS case to go to trial was Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D.
Ala. 2003). A jury found the defendant not liable on July 26, 2007. See Jay Reeves, Labor Undeterred
by Drummond Verdict, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 27, 2007, available at http://www.abcmoney.co.uk/
news/272007IIo323.htm. An appeal is currently pending before the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. See Estate of Rodriguez, 256 F. Supp. 2d 125o, appeal docketed, No. 07-I 4090-V (Iith Ci-.
Sep. 4, 2007). Shortly thereafter, another international corporate case went to trial and is still ongoing.
See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63832 (N.D. Cal. July 23,
2008). A trial date of February 9, 2009 has been set in a pair of associated cases in the Southern
District of New York. See Minute Entry, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. I:96-cv-o8386KMW-HPB (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2008) (consolidating Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. I:96-cvo8386-KMW-HPB, and Wiwa v. Anderson, No. I:oI-cv-oI9O9-KMW-HPB). Another case is set to go
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ATS cases against corporate defendants involve high stakes on both
sides. For victims, these cases offer an unusual chance to receive
monetary compensation for human rights violations," in addition to
providing symbolic vindication and deterring corporate involvement in
internationally wrongful conduct. For corporations, ATS cases carry the
potential exposure to enforceable money judgments in U.S. courts that,
they argue, can deter legitimate business activity by creating intolerable
levels of uncertainty for investors and shareholders. More generally,
corporate ATS litigation has become a battleground in broader struggles
over the role of tort litigation in regulating corporate behavior, and the
role of U.S. courts in disputes that may implicate foreign affairs.
Against this backdrop, this Article seeks to resolve the core
doctrinal puzzle of what body of law governs accomplice liability under
the ATS, and to provide an analytic roadmap for courts confronting this
question. In Part I, I sketch the framework established in Sosa,
emphasizing the most salient points for determining what body of law
applies to allegations of accomplice liability. In Part II, I present
contending approaches to the question of accomplice liability, and
conclude that the most coherent approach conceptualizes accomplice
liability as a conduct-regulating rule defined by international law, rather
than an ancillary question governed by domestic law. I then examine

to trial for alleged violations of state law, even though the ATS claim was dismissed from the case. See
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 0ICV0I357, 2oo8 WL 3914902 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2oo8); see also Doe v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005). Similarly, Ibrahim v. Titan Corp. and Saleh v.
Titan Corp., Nos. 04-1248, 05- 165 (summary judgment motions argued Oct. 3, 2007), are likely to go
to trial despite dismissal of the ATS claim from the case. See Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d i
(D.D.C. 2007), petitionsfor appealgrantedsub nom. In re CACI Premier Tech., Inc., No. o8-8oo ,2oo8
U.S. App. LEXIS 6649 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17,2008). Two recently filed cases were terminated early in the
litigation. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d I128 (N.D. Cal. 2oo8) (dismissed on
state secrets grounds Feb. 13, 2oo8); Wang Xiaoning v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 07-2151 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr.
18, 2007) (settled Nov. 13, 2007). ATS claims against Chiquita Brands International have recently been
consolidated with other claims against Chiquita in multi-district litigation (MDL) in the Southern
District of Florida. In re Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., Alien Tort Statute & S'holders Derivative Litig.,
536 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (J.P.M.L. 2oo8).
ii. ATS judgments against individual defendants provide invaluable symbolic vindication for
plaintiffs and can deter human rights abusers from entering or remaining in the United States, but
money judgments against these defendants are notoriously difficult, if not impossible, to collect.
Defendants might not have significant assets in the United States, and U.S. judgments can be difficult
to enforce abroad. See, e.g., Edward A. Amley, Jr., Note, Sue and Be Recognized: Collecting 1350
Judgments Abroad, 107 YALE L.J. 2177 (1998) (discussing strategies for seeking foreign recognition
and enforcement of ATS judgments). One noteworthy exception is the ATS suit brought by the
Center for Justice and Accountability against former Haitian military commander Carl Dorrlien.
Dordlien's presence in the United States became widely known when he won the Florida lottery in
1997, and attorneys for plaintiffs were able to recover some of the remaining lottery funds in
satisfaction of a 2oo7 ATS judgment against Dorrlien. See Center for Justice and Accountability,
Haiti: Carl Dorrlien, http://www.cja.org/cases/dorelien.shtml (last visited Nov. 13, 2008) (describing
the proceedings and outcome). For the record, I have collaborated with CJA on several briefs in other
cases.
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international law doctrine on accomplice liability, and conclude that the
Second Circuit's articulation of a "purposefulness" standard in cases
involving alleged corporate complicity in the crime of apartheid misstates
the applicable law, which prohibits knowingly providing assistance that
has a substantial effect on the commission of the wrongful act. In Part III,
I describe the implications of this doctrinal analysis for broader concerns
about the indeterminacy of international law, the delegation of lawmaking power to international institutions, and notions of international
comity. I emphasize that by interpreting and applying international law,
rather than interposing domestic law, U.S. courts can provide domestic
remedies for international wrongs while avoiding criticisms of
illegitimately applying U.S. substantive law outside U.S. territory. 2
I. THE SOSA FRAMEWORK
Confusion about the legal standards governing ATS cases stems, in
part, from the terse phrasing of the statute itself. The ATS, which was
enacted by the first Congress as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, states
that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States."' 3 The choice of law question arises both at
the stage of establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction over the
claim, and in adjudicating the merits of the claim. While the Supreme
Court in Sosa characterized this statute as "in terms only jurisdictional,"
it nonetheless found that the statute provides a "limited, implicit sanction
to entertain the handful of international law cum common law claims
understood in 1789."'" Treaty claims aside,'5 violations of the "law of
12. The District Court for the Southern District of Indiana recently underscored this point in
refusing to apply Indiana tort law to allegations of child labor in Liberia, stating: "The case proceeds in
this court because the Alien Tort Statute authorizes certain claims under international law, but the
statute does not provide an invitation to apply substantive domestic United States law to activity
throughout the world." Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., No. i:o6-cv-o62 7-DFH-JMS, 2o08 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 53248, at *7-8 (S.D. Ind. July II, 2008). But see Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 01-1357
(LFO), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11732, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2006) (applying U.S. rather than
Indonesian law to allegations of human rights abuses by Indonesian soldiers protecting defendant's
pipeline in Indonesia because "the United States, the leader of the free world, has an overarching,
vital interest in the safety, prosperity, and consequences of the behavior of its citizens, particularly its
super-corporations conducting business in one or more foreign countries").
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). See generally Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over
InternationalLaw Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, i8N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POE. i, 31 n.128,
39 n.171 (1985) (noting that the comma after "only," and the word "committed," were inserted into
the text in the 1948 recodification of the statute).
14. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,712 (2004).
15. I do not examine the treaty prong of the ATS here. Several courts have recently addressed
the question of whether treaty violations can give rise to civil actions in U.S. courts under either the
ATS or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and have reached different results. Compare De Los Santos Mora v. New
York, 524 F.3d 183, 209 (2d Cir. 2oo8) (amended May 12, 20o8) (holding no right to sue), Gandara v.
Bennett, 528 F.3d 823, 829 (1 ith Cir. 2008) (holding no right to sue), and Cornejo v. San Diego, 504
F.3d 853, 864 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding no right to sue), with Jogi v. Voges, 48o F.3d 822, 836 (7th Cir.
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nations" that support federal subject matter jurisdiction include present
and future claims that "rest on a norm of international character
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable
to the features of the eighteenth-century paradigms' 6 of violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy."
Sosa has received close scrutiny in part because of its affirmation
that the ATS, although "in terms only jurisdictional," enables plaintiffs
to sue without congressional enactment of a specific cause of action. This
is because the First Congress viewed international law as part of the
common law, which could itself be implemented directly by U.S. courts.' s
The Sosa majority resisted the conclusion that the ATS itself provides a
cause of action, but it did not allow positivist notions of law as the
command of a particular sovereign to override the will of the First
Congress. Instead, the Sosa majority held that the ATS provides
"authority to recognize [a] right of action"' 9 in federal courts. These
rights of action are based on a particular category of international law
rules that "bind[] individuals for the benefit of other individuals" and
that "overlap[] with the norms of state relationships."2 Such rules must
"rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world
and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the
2007) (holding right to sue under § 1983). For commentary, see Chimhne I. Keitner & Kenneth C.
Randall, Introductory Note to Cornejo v. San Diego, 46 I.L.M. 1158 (2007), and Keitner & Randall,
supra note 2.
16. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725; see also id. at 732 (articulating this standard).
17. Sosa thus reaffirmed that international law is part of U.S. law for the purpose of establishing
federal jurisdiction over certain violations of international law. Id. at 729-30; see The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (affirming that "[i]uternational [sic] law is part of our law"). My colleague
William Dodge has characterized the Sosa majority's opinion as adopting a "particularized approach"
to the integration of customary international law into federal common law. See William S.Dodge,
Bridging Erie: Customary InternationalLaw in the U.S. Legal System After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 87, 96-97 (2004); see also Keitner & Randall, supra note 2, n.21 (citing
judicial statements comparing scope of federal jurisdiction for international law violations under
§ 135

o

and § 133).

i8.See, e.g., William S. Dodge, The HistoricalOrigins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the
"Originalists," 19 HASnNGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 221, 234 (1996) (emphasizing that "the Founding
Generation understood that the law of nations was part of American common law and that a tort
violating that law would be cognizable at common law just as any other tort would be").
59. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712; see also id. at 729 (emphasizing that "post-Erie understanding has
identified limited enclaves in which federal courts may derive some substantive law in a common law
way"). The Supreme Court's affirmation in Sosa that international law norms actionable under the
ATS constitute one such enclave has not quieted academic debate over the status of customary
international law as federal common law, a debate I do not engage here. For recent contributions, see
Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, CustomaryInternationalLaw, and the ContinuingRelevance of Erie, 120
HARv. L. REV. 869, 924-29 (2OO7), and responses by William S.Dodge, Customary InternationalLaw
and the Question of Legitimacy, 12o HARV. L. REV. F. 19 (2007), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/
forum/issues/I2o/febo7/dodge.pdf, and Ernest A. Young, Sosa and the Retail Incorporation of
InternationalLaw, 120 HARV. L. REv. F. 28, 33 (2007), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/
12o/febo7/young.pdf.
20. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715.
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eighteenth-century paradigms" that the First Congress had in mind in
order to provide subject matter jurisdiction in federal courts."
Sosa thus affirmed that international law encompasses more than
just rules governing the conduct of states; international law also includes
"rules binding individuals for the benefit of other individuals" that can
be enforced in domestic courts." ATS cases implement this conception of
international law. For example, in Filirtiga v. Pena-Irala, Joelito
Fihrtiga's father and sister sued a former Paraguayan Inspector General
of Police, who had allegedly tortured Joelito to death in Paraguay before
moving to Brooklyn. 3 This case resulted in a landmark ATS decision by
the Second Circuit upholding federal jurisdiction over Pena-Irala's
violation of international law.24 In Doe v. Unocal Corp., which is often
viewed as the paradigm corporate ATS case, plaintiffs alleged that the
Myanmar (Burmese) military committed forced labor, rape, torture, and
murder in the course of providing security for an oil pipeline
construction project in rural Myanmar that was partially owned and
overseen by Unocal, and they sought to hold Unocal liable for these
international law violations. 5 The parties settled this case in March 2005,
on the eve of a jury trial in California on parallel state law claims and an
en banc rehearing of a Ninth Circuit panel decision favorable to the
plaintiffs on their ATS claims6

21. Id. at 725.
22. Id. at 715; see also id. at 724 (referring to international law violations "with a potential for
personal liability").
23. Fildrtiga v. Pena-Irala, 63o F.2d 876,878-79 (2d Cir. i98o).
24. Id. at 88o. On remand to the district court, the defendant defaulted, and the court entered a
judgment for the plaintiffs totaling over $Io million. Fildrtiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 86o, 867
(E.D.N.Y.1984).
25. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 937-40 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir.
2003). Myanmar itself, like all foreign states that are not designated "state sponsors of terrorism," is
immune from suit in U.S. courts unless the claim against it comes within an exception to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611.
26. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005). In the context of growing awareness of
corporate exposure under the ATS, Senator Dianne Feinstein introduced an amendment to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 that would have limited ATS suits to those "asserting a claim of torture, extrajudicial killing,
genocide, piracy, slavery, or slave trading if a defendant is a direct participant acting with specific
intent to commit the alleged tort." S. 1874, 109th Cong. (1995) (introduced Oct. 17, 2005). Senator
Feinstein withdrew the proposed amendment on October 25, 2005. Letter from Dianne Feinstein, U.S.
Senator, to Arlen Specter, U.S. Senator (Oct. 25, 2005), available at http://www.earthrights.org/files/
Documents/feinsteinatca.pdf. In April 20o8, United States State Department Legal Adviser John
Bellinger gave a policy address indicating the current Executive's position that "there are good
reasons for limits on the scope of the ATS-through courts exercising restraint, or if necessary,
through legislation." John B. Bellinger III, U.S. State Dep't Legal Advisor, Enforcing Human Rights
in U.S. Courts and Abroad: The Alien Tort Statute and Other Approaches, Address at the 2o08
Jonathan I. Charney Lecture in International Law (Apr. II, 2oo8) (transcript available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/rls/io35o6.htm). At time of writing, no further legislative action had been
taken with respect to the ATS.
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Although the precedents for holding both individuals and
corporations liable for international law violations in certain
circumstances are well established, their contours remain contested. I
will briefly address two threshold jurisdictional issues, before moving on
to what I believe is the more important, and less analyzed, question of
what law governs allegations of accomplice liability brought under the
ATS. This Part is aimed primarily at those unfamiliar with the treatment
of subject matter jurisdiction and the ability to sue non-state actors under
the ATS. The law on these questions is relatively settled and informs
which ATS suits can proceed.
A.

ESTABLISHING SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Although the ATS was intended to provide a federal forum for
adjudicating alleged violations of international law, its jurisdictional
grant is not unlimited.27 Plaintiffs must allege a well-accepted and
specifically defined violation of international law in order to survive a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."' Prior to Sosa,

federal courts required plaintiffs to allege the violation of a "specific,
universal, and obligatory" international law norm. 9 As indicated above,

27. Some commentators question the constitutionality of federal jurisdiction over suits brought
by alien plaintiffs against alien defendants for any international law violation absent some other basis
for Article III jurisdiction, a debate I do not engage in here. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien
Tort Statute and Article 111, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587, 590-92 (2oo2) (arguing that the ATS was originally
meant to implement Article III alienage jurisdiction, and that the law of nations is not part of the
federal common law that would support Article III "arising under" jurisdiction); Thomas H. Lee, The
Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, IO6 COLUM. L. REV. 830, 835-40 (2006) (questioning the
Sosa Court's assumption that there was a constitutional basis for federal jurisdiction in the case before
it). But see, e.g., Fildrtiga,630 F.2d at 885 (finding that "[t]he constitutional basis for the Alien Tort
Statute is the law of nations, which has always been part of the federal common law"); William S.
Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA.
J. INT'L L. 687, 711-12 (2002) (arguing that the Framers intended Article III's reference to cases
arising under "the Laws of the United States" to include cases arising under the law of nations);
William A. Fletcher, InternationalHuman Rights in American Courts, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 5, 8
(20O7), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbriefJ2oo7/o3/22/fletcher.pdf (observing that "the Court's
decision [in Sosa] necessarily implies that the federal common law of customary international law is
jurisdiction-conferring").
28. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Courts cannot properly entertain motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim before establishing that they have jurisdiction. See Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. 678, 682 (1946). Nevertheless, defendants in ATS cases have filed 12(b)(i) and 12(b)(6) motions
concurrently, and courts have not consistently differentiated between these types of motions. Compare
Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, ioo4-o6 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (where defendants filed a
motion to dismiss under I2(b)(i) and 12(b)(6), emphasizing the distinction between standards for
subject matter jurisdiction and sufficient pleading of claims on the merits), with In re Sinaltrainal
Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1284-85 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (noting the Eleventh Circuit's blurred analysis of
I2(b)(I) and 12(b)(6) criteria in ATS cases).
29. Hilao v. Marcos (Estate I), 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994). For example, in the pre-Sosa
case Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 254-55 (2d Cir. 2003), the Second Circuit found that
the "right to life" and "right to health" were not defined with the requisite degree of specificity, and
that there was no identifiable customary international law norm prohibiting "intranational" pollution.

November 2008]

CONCEPTUALIZING COMPLICITY

the Sosa Court articulated its own standard: "[A]ccept[ance] by the
civilized world" plus "defin[ition] with a specificity comparable" to the
three eighteenth-century paradigms of violation of safe conducts,
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.3" Even though
Sosa used new terminology, the majority cited pre-Sosa cases with
approval on the question of how to identify a sufficiently specific and
universal international law norm.3' The Sosa standard thus appears to be
functionally equivalent to the previously articulated standard.3"
The jurisdictional threshold under the ATS has acted as a barrier to
certain corporate cases. For example, the Second Circuit recently
dismissed a high-profile case against the manufacturers of Agent Orange
on the grounds that the spraying of herbicide to destroy crops, when not
intentionally used to injure human populations, did not violate a
universally accepted international law norm at the time of the Vietnam
War.3 The court did not address the accomplice liability issue (the
defendants' manufacturing), because it found that the underlying
violation (the U.S. government's spraying) did not meet the Sosa
jurisdictional standard.34

Sosa affirmed that "the door is still ajar" to "further independent
judicial recognition of actionable international norms" 3 5-in other words,
that, over time, international condemnation of additional forms of
The case was therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Id. at 266. In
my view, it is appropriate to characterize Flores as an application of the criteria articulated in Fildrtiga,
rather than a retreat from those criteria. But cf.Bradley et al., supra note I9,at 89o-9i (taking the
opposite view).
30. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
31. Id. at 732 n.20 (comparing Judge Edwards' finding in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic that
there was "insufficient consensus in 1984 that torture by private actors violates international law" with
the Second Circuit's finding in Kadic v. Karadzic that there was "sufficient consensus in 1995 that
genocide by private actors violates international law" (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 791-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-41 (2d
Cir. 1995))).
32. But see Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1247 (sith Cir. 2005)
(refusing to follow pre-Sosa cases recognizing an ATS claim for cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment, on the grounds that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
does not create obligations enforceable in U.S. courts under the Sosa standard).
33. Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 123 (2d Cir.
2OO8) (granting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim). The Second Circuit
discussed the Sosa opinion at some length, but it also relied on its own pre-Sosa jurisprudence in
defining the appropriate criteria for identifying an actionable violation of international law. Id. at 11617.

34. For other dismissals based on the underlying violation's failure to meet the Sosa standard, see,
for example, Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F. 3 d 767, 776 (6th Cir. 2oo7), dismissing case alleging "crossborder 'parental child abduction' by an individual with full guardianship (or custody)" for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, and Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. oi Civ. 8118(WHP), 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16126, at *4r (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005), dismissing case alleging nonconsensual medical
experimentation for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
35. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
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conduct could become sufficiently universal to satisfy the jurisdictional
threshold for an ATS suit. However, the Court emphasized that, in
Justice Souter's unique phrase, such recognition remains "subject to
vigilant doorkeeping. ''36 Federal courts perform this "doorkeeping"
function in the first instance by examining the alleged underlying
violation to ensure that it meets the threshold criteria of acceptance and
specificity articulated in Sosa and applied in prior cases. Plaintiffs who do
not allege an underlying violation that satisfies this initial hurdle cannot
bring their claims in federal court. I argue below that, provided the
underlying violation meets the Sosa standard, claims for aiding and
abetting that violation also give rise to federal subject matter jurisdiction
because aiding and abetting liability is sufficiently well established under
international law.37
B.

SUING NON-STATE ACTORS

Some private defendants argue that, because they are not state
actors, they should not be subject to the international law-based
jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts. This argument relies on a strict
conception of international law as law among states, and ignores the Sosa
Court's affirmation that certain international law rules "bind[]
individuals for the benefit of other individuals. '' 38 All of the eighteenthcentury paradigms cited in Sosa can be committed by private actors and
give rise to ATS jurisdiction." Although many wrongs committed by
private actors do not rise to the level of international law violations,
private actors are not exempt from the reach of international law or ATS
jurisdiction.
In Kadic v. Karadzic, which remains a foundational case on the
possibility of international law violations by non-state actors, Bosnian
Serb leader Radovan Karadzic argued unsuccessfully that international
law norms by their very nature "bind only states and persons acting
under color of a state's law, not private individuals."4' The Second Circuit
appropriately rejected this position,4 as had the Nuremberg Tribunal
36. Id.
37. Conceptually, there are at least two ways to think about what it means to be "sufficiently"
well established. One could either apply the Sosa standard to aiding and abetting liability, or view
aiding and abetting liability through the lens of customary international law. Although aiding and
abetting liability satisfies both of these approaches, it may be more elegant doctrinally to apply Sosa to
the underlying violation for the purposes of establishing subject matter jurisdiction, and then apply a
customary international law analysis to define the defendant's mode of liability for contributing to the
underlying violation. This is the approach I take in Part II.B.3, infra.
38. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715.

39. My thanks to William Dodge for highlighting this point. See Dodge, supra note I8, at 226
(noting that each of the offenses against the law of nations identified by Blackstone "would typically
have been committed by individuals").
40. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995).
41. See id. at 240 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
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after World War II.' Today, international law violations that do not

require state action include genocide, certain war crimes, piracy, slavery,
forced labor, aircraft hijacking, and acts committed in furtherance of
those violations. 43
Corporate defendants additionally argue that they should not be
subject to ATS jurisdiction because corporations, they claim, are not
themselves subjects of international law.' This argument misconstrues
the absence of international criminal jurisdiction over corporations as
evidence that international law does not prohibit certain forms of
corporate misconduct. Although this argument has not enjoyed success
in ATS cases to date, it continues to be advanced by some
commentators. 45 Proponents of this position tend to rely on the Sosa

majority's statement that "'[a] related consideration" for whether a norm

STATES § 404 (1987)) (enumerating international law violations that can be committed by private
actors, including "piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and
perhaps certain acts of terrorism"). Certain crimes against humanity could appropriately be added to
this list. See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C99-o25o6SI, 2oo6 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 632o9, at *II (N.D.
Cal., Aug. 22, 2oo6) (citing cases in support of the finding that crimes against humanity may be
committed by private actors). But cf Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. I:96-cv-08386-KMWHPB, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *39 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 22, 2002) (finding that crimes against
humanity of summary execution, arbitrary imprisonment, and persecution of a group based on
political grounds require a showing of state action).
42. See Kadic, 7o F.3d at 243; see also Brief of the International Human Rights Law Group et al.,
as Amici Curiae Submitted in Opposition to Defendant's Motion, Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (No. Civ-9 3-o878), at 9-io, (cited in Anita Ramasastry, Secrets and Lies? Swiss Banks
and International Human Rights, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 325, 401 nn.351-52 (1998)). This brief
cited the following cases: United States v. Flick (The Flick Case), 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. io,
NUERNBERG

TRIALS],

available at

at

I 1 (1952) [hereinafter

http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military-Law/NTs-war-criminals.html

(setting forth the indictment of steel magnate and five principal associates); United States v. Krupp
(The Krupp Case), 9 NUERNBERG TRIALS, supra, at 7 (indicting private industrialist and eleven top
aides): United States v. Carl Krauch (The Farben Case), 7 NUERNBERG TRIALS, supra, at Io (indicting
twenty-four directors and officers of I.G. Farben-Industrie A.G.); United States v. von Weizsaecker
(The Ministries Case), 12 NUERNBERG TRIALS, supra, at 13, i8 (indicting prominent ministers, including
Karl Rasche, chairman of the Dresden Bank for his actions as a private banker).

43. See

SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION

48

(2004).

44. See Brief of Professor Christopher Greenwood as Amicus Curiae in Support of DefendantAppellee, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., No. 07-0016 (2d Cir. 2007) at 1O-19
(on file with The Hastings Law Journal); Brief of Professor James Crawford as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Defendant-Appellee, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., No. 07-0016
(2d Cir. 20o7) at 3-7 (on file with The Hastings Law Journal). But cf. INT'L PEACE ACAD. & FAFO,
BUSINESS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: ASSESSING THE LIABILITY OF BUSINESS ENTITIES FOR GRAvE

VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 19-22 (2004), available at http://www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/76/
BusinessandIntCrime.pdf (indicating that international law does bind corporations, even though no
international forum currently has jurisdiction to prosecute corporate defendants).
45. See, e.g., Julian Ku, Keeping the Courthouse Door Open for InternationalLaw Claims Against
Corporations: Rethinking Sosa, 9 ENGAGE 81, 83 (2008), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/
publications/publD.689/pub-detail.asp (arguing in a Federalist Society publication that the concept of
corporate liability for international law violations is not sufficiently specific, universal, or obligatory to
support ATS jurisdiction).
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is sufficiently definite to support a cause of action "is whether
international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given
norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor
such as a corporationor individual.'' ', 6 Viewed in context, however, this

sentence actually supports the possibility of corporate liability under the
ATS. The Sosa majority was concerned with whether a private actor, as
opposed to a state actor, can violate international law, not with whether a
corporation, as opposed to an individual, can do so." By grouping
"corporations and individuals" together as private actors, the statement
can be read as affirming the potential liability of corporations alongside
private individuals under the ATS. 48
Although Sosa did not involve a corporate defendant, the majority
in that case seems to have taken the possibility of corporate ATS liability
for granted. This is because, in appropriate circumstances, a U.S. court
could properly assert both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction over
a corporation for certain international law violations. If the Court revisits
this issue in a future case, the most coherent approach would look to U.S.
law on the question of personal jurisdiction, including the type of entity
against which a claim can be asserted. As I argue below, international
law would supply the substantive, conduct-regulating rules that apply to
private actors. 9 Looking to domestic law on personal jurisdiction would
be consistent with the Karadzic court's acceptance of tag jurisdiction as
an appropriate means of securing personal jurisdiction over the
defendant under U.S. law, even though international law disfavors tag
jurisdiction."0 The challenge, to which I now turn, is identifying the
46. Bradley et al., supranote 19, at 928 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20
(2004)) (empahsis added).
47. In the text of the Sosa opinion, the quotation is followed by an invitation to compare Judge
Edwards's finding in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic that there was "insufficient consensus in 1984
that torture by private actors violates international law" with the Second Circuit's finding in Kadic v.
Karadzic that there was "sufficient consensus in 1995 that genocide by private actors violates
international law." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.2o (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,
791-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring); Kadic v. Karadzic, 7o F. 3d 232, 239-41 (2d Cir.
1995)).

48. Consistent with this interpretation, Justice Breyer paraphrased the majority's opinion in his
concurrence as requiring that an actionable norm "extend liability to the type of perpetrator (e.g., a
private actor) the plaintiff seeks to sue." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 76o (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing id. at 732
n.2o (majority opinion)). This further suggests that the distinction at issue in Sosa footnote twenty is
that between state actors and private actors, and that private actors in this context include both
individuals and corporations. See id. at 732 n.20 (majority opinion).
49. As Doug Cassel points out, the potential individual criminal liability of corporate executives
themselves as accessories to international crimes "has long been clear." See Cassel, supra note 4, at
304.

50. Compare Karadzic, 7o F.3 d at 247 (applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and U.S.
standards for asserting personal jurisdiction consistent with due process), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FoREIoN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §421 cmt. e (1987) (indicating that "'Tag'

jurisdiction, i.e., jurisdiction based on service of process on a person only transitorily in the territory of
the state, is not generally acceptable under international law").
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circumstances in which a defendant corporation subject to U.S.
jurisdiction can be held civilly liable under the ATS for contributing to
an international law violation by a state.
II. ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
The problem of what law to apply in ATS cases arises at two
junctures: first, at the stage of establishing federal subject matter
jurisdiction over the claim, and second, in adjudicating the merits of the
claim." In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, lower courts have
approached allegations of corporate accomplice liability in one of two
ways.
I call the first approach the "ancillary question" approach, because it
characterizes the standards for the accomplice defendant's liability as
"ancillary" to the underlying tort committed by the state. Judge
Reinhardt adopted this position in his concurrence in Unocal." Under
this approach, a U.S. court must first establish that it has subject matter
jurisdiction over the underlying international law violation committed by
the state, whether or not it has personal jurisdiction over that state. 3 The
court can then adjudicate the corporate defendant's liability for
contributing to that violation by applying a different body of law-U.S.
federal common law.

51. Judge Bork anticipated this separate choice of law question in his concurrence in Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 804 n.1o (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring). Judge Kaufman
made a similar observation in Fildrtiga, stating that "the question of federal jurisdiction under the
Alien Tort Statute, which requires consideration of the law of nations," should not be confused "with
the issue of the choice of law to be applied .... The two issues are distinct.' Fildrtiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. i98o). The Tel-Oren court did not have to consider the choice of law question,
because it did not find subject matter jurisdiction over the alleged violation. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 798.
The Fildrtigacourt did find jurisdiction and, on remand, the district court reasoned that "[i]f the 'tort'
to which the statute refers is the violation of international law, the court must look to that body of law
to determine what substantive principles to apply" to define the norm in question. Fildrtiga v. PenaIrala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). After having looked to international law to establish the
applicable standard prohibiting torture, the district court found that the ATS provided it with
authority to "choose and develop federal remedies to effectuate the purposes of the international law
incorporated into United States common law," and, accordingly, to award punitive damages not
available under Paraguayan law. Id. at 863-64. The district court in Fildrtiga recognized that
international law could not govern all aspects of an ATS claim because international law does not
contain detailed rules on questions such as remedies. Id. Some aspects of ATS claims, then, must
necessarily be governed by domestic law, whether that of the forum or the place of injury. However, as
I argue below, the standard for accomplice liability is not one of these aspects.
52. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 963 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring), vacated,
395 F.3d 978 (9 th Cir. 2003).

53. It is worth noting that the principal state's absence from the litigation does not preclude
adjudication of the defendant's accomplice liability. This is consistent with the principle set forth in
Aldinger v. Howard, which my colleague Richard Marcus helpfully brought to my attention-that
federal litigation could proceed against county officials for the petitioner's alleged improper discharge
even though there was no pendent federal jurisdiction over the petitioner's state law claims against the
county itself. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1976).
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I call the second approach the "conduct-regulating rules" approach,54
because it treats the defendant accomplice's participation as an integral
part of the alleged violation. This approach applies international law to
the conduct of the accomplice (here, the company), as well as to the
conduct of the principal (here, the state). Judge Katzmann articulated
this position in his recent concurrence in Khulumani, although he
misidentified the international law standard for accomplice liability, as I
describe below. Under this approach, international law defines both the
jurisdiction-creating norm violated by the principal and the degree of
participation required by the accomplice in order to support liability
under the ATS.
The conduct-regulating rules approach is the only approach that
makes sense, because the ATS grants federal courts jurisdiction to
adjudicate alleged violations of international law (adjudicative
jurisdiction) and to enforce international law by providing penalties for
those violations (enforcement jurisdiction). U.S. domestic law governs
many important aspects of ATS cases, such as the personal jurisdiction of
U.S. courts and matters of practice and procedure.: International law
standards on accomplice liability govern whether a defendant is liable for
wrongful conduct. As I explore further in Part III below, the conductregulating rules approach not only has the advantage of doctrinal
coherence and consistency with the ATS's original jurisdictional grant,
but it also avoids criticism of applying U.S. law to defendants' conduct in
an international system that generally disfavors the extraterritorial
application of domestic substantive law.57

A.

Is NOT AN "ANCILLARY QUESTION"
Although I disagree with the "ancillary question" approach, it is
worth considering, particularly given judges' presumed and
understandable preference for applying domestic law. The ancillary
question approach makes sense for matters of practice and procedure,
WHY ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY

54. As indicated below, I borrow the term "conduct-regulating" from William Casto. See William
R. Casto, Regulating the New Privateersof the Twenty-First Century, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 695 (2oo6).
55. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 280-82 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J.,

concurring).
56. Cf Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-74 (1965) (discussing importance of differentiating
between rules that modify substantive rights and those that affect the administration of remedies in the
context of choice of law in federal diversity cases).
57. The ATS was originally enacted at least in part to provide a federal forum for suits that did
not meet the requirements of alienage jurisdiction, whether the challenged conduct took place
overseas or on U.S. soil. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the JudiciaryAct of
1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 480 (1989); Dodge, supra note i8, at 236 & n.so6.
However, in practice, the vast majority of ATS cases involve conduct that took place overseas. But cf.
Jarna v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 386 (D.N.J. 2004) (denying private contractor's summary judgment

motion on ATS claim for gross mistreatment of non-criminal detainees awaiting decisions on their
asylum applications).
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but not for accomplice liability standards. Treating accomplice liability as
an ancillary question means that, as Judge Reinhardt recognized in his
Unocal concurrence, "if Unocal is held liable, it will... not [be] because
Unocal itself engaged in acts transgressing international law"'8 but
because "the Myanmar military committed the illegal acts and Unocal is
determined to be legally responsible for that governmental conduct
under a [U.S.] theory of third-party liability."59 This does not make sense.
Proponents of the ancillary question approach separate the state's
underlying violation, which is governed by international law, from the
defendant's mode of participation in that violation, which they argue
should be governed by U.S. domestic law.6° However, they fail to offer a
principled explanation of why the defendant's mode of participation is
properly characterized as an "ancillary question" in this context. Without
such an account, this approach remains unpersuasive.
Judge Reinhardt proposed the "ancillary question" approach in his
concurring opinion in Doe v. Unocal, a pre-Sosa case involving Unocal's
alleged complicity in forced labor, rape, and murder committed by the
Burmese military. 6' His opinion separates the underlying tort of summary
execution by the Burmese (Myanmar) military from what he calls the
"ancillary legal question" of Unocal's liability as an accessory or
accomplice to this violation.62 Judge Reinhardt agrees that the underlying
tort must violate an international norm that meets what is now the Sosa
58. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 964 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring), vacated,
395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).
59. Id.
6o. For example, Paul Hoffman and Daniel Zaheer have categorized "the rules governing
accomplice liability, statutes of limitations, determination of damages, standing to sue, and the other
rules necessary to litigate a civil case" as "nuts and bolts questions" not governed by international law.
Paul L. Hoffman & Daniel A. Zaheer, The Rules of the Road: Federal Common Law and Aiding and
Abetting Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 47, 52 (2003). In their
view, these questions should be governed by "apply[ing] the uniform rules of federal common law
derived from international and federal law." Id. at 66. However, Hoffman and Zaheer do not provide
a principled basis for categorizing "the rules governing accomplice liability" as ancillary questions akin
to standing and statutes of limitations, as opposed to conduct-regulating rules defined by international
law.
6I. The Unocal majority did not endorse the "ancillary question" approach, although it reached
the same result as Judge Reinhardt. Judge Pregerson's opinion, written on behalf of himself and Judge
Tashima, looked largely to the decisions of international criminal tribunals to determine the scope of
accomplice liability, while remaining open to the possibility that federal common law principles could
also furnish "viable" grounds for liability. Unocal, 395 F.3 d at 947 n.2o. Judge Pregerson downplayed
the choice between federal common law and international law, because he concluded that the
international criminal law standard for aiding and abetting is similar to the domestic tort law standard
found in section 876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. at 948 n.23; see also id. at 95 1 (setting
forth the Restatement standard).
62. See id. at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). Judge Reinhardt refers to Unocal's liability as
"third-party tort liability," id., but as my colleague Richard Marcus helpfully pointed out to me, it
seems more accurate to characterize the company as an accessory or accomplice, rather than a "third
party."
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standard. According to Judge Reinhardt, however, once this
jurisdictional threshold is met, a company's liability for a state's tortious
conduct can be evaluated "by applying general federal common law tort6
principles, such as agency, joint venture, or reckless disregard. ,
Although Judge Reinhardt acknowledges that international law governs
the "substantive component" 64 of the ATS, he limits this "substantive
component" to the jurisdiction-creating tort committed by the state
actor, and he applies65 U.S. federal common law to the defendant
corporation's conduct.
Judge Hall also looked to federal common law to define the
elements of aiding and abetting liability in the more recent Khulumani
case, which involves claims against corporations for complicity in
international law violations in apartheid South Africa.66 Although Judge
Hall does not rule out the possibility of looking to international law to
define modes of participation in international law violations, 6' he treats
the resort to federal common law as a default position: "Lacking the
benefit of clear guidance, I presume a federal court should resort to its
traditional source, the federal common law, when deriving a standard" of
aiding and abetting liability. 6 Moreover, in Judge Hall's view:
[W]hen international law and domestic law speak on the same
doctrine, domestic courts should choose the latter.... Here, customary
international law and the federal common law both include standards
of aiding and abetting. In a situation such
69 as this, I opt for the standard

articulated by the federal common law.
Judge Reinhardt opined that applying international law to the question
of accomplice liability would involve impermissibly "substitutfing]
international law principles for established federal common law or other
domestic law principles."7 However, neither Judge Hall nor Judge
Reinhardt provides adequate conceptual or doctrinal support for the
notion that applying domestic law constitutes the appropriate default
position in alien tort litigation. To the contrary, given that ATS was
intended to provide a federal forum for adjudicating international law
violations, one should not "substitute" domestic law standards for wellestablished international law standards on accomplice liability, which is
what the ancillary question approach does.

63. Id.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 966.
Id. at 966-67.
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 287 (2d Cir. 2007) (Hall, J., concurring).
Id. at 286 n.4.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 287.
Unocal, 395 F.3d at 966 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
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The choice of law problem is a distinctly modern one. The First
Congress enacted the ATS to provide a federal forum for violations of
international law that were already cognizable at common law." The
division between domestic and international law was not consequential
in this context, because both normative regimes were seen as based on
natural law.7" Today, by contrast, positivist understandings of law as the

command of a particular sovereign, rather than the product of universal
reason, present judges with a choice. While applying domestic law to
defendants' conduct might have some practical appeal, it lacks
conceptual and doctrinal coherence in the ATS framework. It also raises
the specter of illegitimately applying U.S. law to the extraterritorial
conduct of non-U.S. defendants, exceeding the limits of domestic
prescriptive jurisdiction based on territory or nationality.73 Applying
international law avoids potential due process concerns based on the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law. It also comports with an
understanding of the ATS as enabling U.S. courts to act as enforcers of
international law.74

In opting to apply domestic (rather than international) law to
Unocal's conduct, Judge Reinhardt expressed distrust of the
jurisprudence of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals established
by the United Nations Security Council in the 199os, including the75
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
The Unocal majority relied heavily on the ad hoc tribunals' jurisprudence
as evidence of the elements of aiding and abetting liability under
international law. 76 Judge Reinhardt characterized this jurisprudence as
''a nascent criminal law doctrine recently adopted by an ad hoc
international criminal tribunal., 77 This characterization misapplies a
common law understanding of judicial opinions as binding precedents to
the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals, which is heavily
influenced by the civil law tradition. 7s

71. See Dodge, supra note 18, at 237.
72. See id. at 225.

73. Of course, some of the wrongful conduct at issue might appropriately be subject to the
exercise of a state's universal jurisdiction to prescribe and punish certain egregious conduct in
violation of international law by imposing criminal or civil penalties on wrongdoers. See RESTATEMENT
(1987).
74. For an elaboration of this view of the ATS as fulfilling the United States' national obligation
to enforce international law, see Burley, supra note 57, at 478, who explains that the First Congress
enacted the ATS "in the knowledge that the federal judiciary could be counted on to enforce the law
of nations as a national obligation."
75. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 967 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J.,concurring), vacated,
395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
76. Id. at 949-51 (majority opinion).
concurring).
77. Id. at 965 (Reinhardt, J.,
78. My thanks to Sonja Starr for raising this point.
(THIRD)OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404
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The ICTY has jurisdiction over serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed on the territory of the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on or after January I, I99I. 79 The
Secretary-General of the United Nations has emphasized that the legality
principle, under which individuals can only be punished for violating
criminal laws that were in force at the time they committed the allegedly
wrongful acts, dictates that "the international tribunal should apply rules
of international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of
customary law." ' Accordingly, the ICTY has taken pains to establish the
customary international law foundation of the substantive law it applies,
including the elements of aiding and abetting liability."' As set forth in
Part III.B.I below, the judgments of international tribunals can
appropriately be viewed as evidence of the existing customary
international law, but are not themselves binding precedents. 8' Their
"nascent" character does not detract from their evidentiary value in
attempting to identify customary international law standards, particularly
given their heavy reliance on the historically significant jurisprudence of
the post-World War II Nuremberg trials and trials conducted under
Control Council Law No. iO.83

Plaintiffs have also expressed reluctance to embrace whole-heartedly
an international law approach to accomplice liability."' This can be
79. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827,
Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
8o. The Secretary General, Report of theSecretary-GeneralPursuantto Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 8o8 (1993), 34, U.N. Doc. S/257o4 (May 3, 1993). The International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda applies customary international law and treaties applicable to Rwanda at the
time of the Rwandan genocide, which also have customary international law status. See Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR- 9 6-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 7 617 (Sept. 2, 1998).
81. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/I, Trial Chamber Judgment, 1 191 (Dec. io,
1998) (indicating that "the Trial Chamber must examine customary international law in order to
establish the content" of aiding and abetting liability); see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 666 (May 7, 1997) ("The concept of direct individual criminal
responsibility and personal culpability for assisting, aiding and abetting, or participating in, in contrast
to the direct commission of, a criminal endeavour or act also has a basis in customary international
law.").
82. See discussion infra, Part III.B.i.
83. See Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-I7/1,

Trial Chamber Judgment, 77193-225,

237-240

(surveying post-World War II cases on accomplice liability); see also Tadic, Case No.IT-9 4 -i-T, Trial
Chamber Judgment, 667-668, 674-680, 682-687 (same). Interestingly, Judge Reinhardt leaves room
for applying international law in the form of federal common law. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932,
967 ( 9 th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring), vacated, 395 F.3d 978 (9 th Cir. 2003). If identifying
international law standards were truly an unworkable or unreliable endeavor, it seems that selectively
incorporating them as federal common law would exacerbate, rather than solve, the problem of
excessive judicial selectivity that Judge Reinhardt identifies as a fatal flaw of the international law
approach. See id. at 970 n.9.
84. For example, Beth Stephens, Judith Chomsky, Jennifer Green, Paul Hoffman, and Michael
Ratner endorse the federal common law approach in the second edition of their extremely valuable
treatise, although they concede that the question remains unsettled. See BETH STEPHENS ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIlHTs LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 319 (2d ed. 20o8).
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explained at least in part as an effort to protect themselves against
corporations' jurisdictional argument that no theories of accessorial or
accomplice liability are sufficiently specific and universally accepted to
support federal subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS. However,
even if the defendant's mode of liability is subject to the Sosa standardsomething that Sosa did not address -aiding and abetting liability meets
this threshold, as I detail below. In ATS cases against both direct
perpetrators and accomplices, U.S. courts can identify and enforce
international law standards without wrapping them in the mantle of
federal common law.
Because aiding and abetting an international law violation itself
violates international law, there is also no need to look to judge-made
federal common law as an interstitial gap-filler to define the elements of
accomplice liability 58 Turning Judge Reinhardt's statement on its head, if
a defendant company is held liable under the ATS for aiding and
abetting an international law violation, it will be because the company
itself engaged in acts transgressing international law, for which U.S. law
provides a remedy in the form of a civil action for damages. 6 Given that
the ATS provides U.S. courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate and enforce
international law, this is as it should be.
B.

WHY THE "CONDUCT-REGULATING RULES" APPROACH POINTS TO

INTERNATIONAL LAW

The ancillary question approach fails because it does not offer a
principled account of why a defendant's mode of liability should be
treated differently from the state's underlying violation for choice of law
purposes. Determining whether or not the norm in question regulates
conduct offers a principled method for differentiating between
substantive and ancillary matters. Defining ancillary questions as those
that do not regulate conduct provides a coherent basis for distinguishing
issues that are governed by international law from those that are
governed by federal common law."' Because the prohibition on aiding
85. Beth Stephens, whose work Judge Hall cites in support of the "ancillary question" approach,
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F. 3 d 254, 286-87 (2d Cir. 2007) (Hall, J., concurring), has

suggested looking first to international law, and then to federal common law as a "gap-filler" where
international law is silent or ambiguous:
The standard practice of federal courts enforcing federal common law claims provides
guidance for resolution of the countless issues that arise in federal court litigation. Where
federal law does not provide a clear rule, the courts borrow from analogous federal or even
state rules, as appropriate, to answer ancillary issues. Here, a court might ask first whether
international law provides a clear answer, then look to federal vicarious liability standards
as necessary to fill any gaps.
Beth Stephens, Comment, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: "The Door Is Still Ajar" for Human Rights
Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REv. 533, 56o (2004) (footnote omitted).

86. Cf Unocal, 395 F.3d at 964 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
87. To the extent that individuals modify their behavior based on expectations about potential
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and abetting wrongdoing regulates conduct, it is governed by
international law under the ATS framework."
Criminal and tort law systems routinely attribute responsibility for
wrongdoing to parties beyond the principal wrongdoer. While variations
exist both within and between national legal systems,", it is
uncontroversial that assisting the commission of a wrongful act can itself
be a wrongful act that warrants the imposition of civil or criminal
penalties, whether or not the principal is also penalized. Borrowing
William Casto's terminology, the prohibition on knowingly assisting a
wrongful act can be characterized as a "conduct-regulating norm."'
Professor Casto writes:
All tort plaintiffs must prove that the defendant has violated some
substantive norm that regulates the defendant's conduct.... Sosa held
that in ATS litigation the norm regulating conduct must be found by
the federal courts in international law. Other rules of decision that are
not conduct-regulating norms are to be legislated by the courts as
ordinary federal common law."

liability, any rules that tend to make it easier or more difficult to bring successful legal claims can be
characterized as "regulating" conduct in a broad sense. Here, however, I use the term much more
narrowly to designate rules specifically intended to differentiate unlawful conduct from lawful
conduct. This is true whether or not the rule creates a separate substantive offense. See, e.g., Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 61I n.40 (2oo6) ("The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), drawing on the Nuremberg precedents, has adopted a 'joint criminal enterprise'
theory of liability, but that is a species of liability for the substantive offense (akin to aiding and
abetting), not a crime on its own."). As Markus Dubber points out with respect to criminal law
generally, "[c]omplicity doctrine is simply one way of satisfying the conduct element of the offence."
Markus D. Dubber, CriminalizingComplicity: A ComparativeAnalysis, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 977, 97879 (2007); cf. Roger S. Clark, Offenses of InternationalConcern:MultilateralState Treaty Practicein the
Forty Years Since Nuremberg, 57 NoRDIc J. INT'L L. 49, 79 (1988) (indicating that, in the Geneva
Conventions, "'[clomitting' as a general term is probably broad enough to include those who aid and
abet").
88. Even though the Sosa opinion reconciles the language of the ATS with positivist
jurisprudence by stating that the common law provides plaintiffs with a right to sue, this does not, in
my view, compel the application of domestic law (here in the form of federal common law) to the
mode of defendant's liability at either the jurisdictional or merits stage of the litigation. But see
Bellinger, supra note 26 ("[T]he Supreme Court held in Sosa that the law to be applied under the ATS
is U.S. federal common law."); STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 84, at 36-37 (arguing that Sosa does
address the choice of law question, and that it compels the application of federal common law to "nonsubstantive issues" including the defendant's mode of liability). This unlikely agreement between
individuals on opposite sides of many ATS debates invites pause, but does not ultimately persuade me
of the soundness of categorizing the mode of liability as an ancillary question.
89. See, e.g., Dubber, supra note 87, at 989-92 (examining models for accomplice liability in
German and American criminal law).
90. See Casto, supra note 54.
I
9 . Id. (footnote omitted); see also William R. Casto, The New Federal Common Law of Tort
Remedies for Violations of InternationalLaw, 37 RUrGERS L.J. 635, 643 (2006) (indicating that, while
rules governing procedural issues and the availability of damages come from domestic law, "the norm
for which a remedy is provided in ATS litigation is clearly governed by international law").
Interestingly, Stephens et al. cite Casto in support of the ancillary question approach because they do
not view the mode of liability as a conduct-regulating rule. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 84, at 37.
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This distinction between "conduct-regulating norms" and "other
rules of decision" categorizes legal standards according to their functions.
In this framework, standards that govern behavior are part of what Judge
Reinhardt would call the "substantive component" of the ATS.92
International law provides these substantive standards, including the
standards for accomplice liability. Federal common law supplies other
rules, such as rules relating to personal jurisdiction and matters of
practice and procedure, which Judge Reinhardt would characterize as
"ancillary.""
Because other statutes that make international law violations
actionable in U.S. courts create causes of action themselves, it follows
that these claims (unlike claims under the ATS) are properly grounded
in domestic law, except where Congress provides otherwise. The Torture
Victim Protection Act of I99I 94 ("TVPA"), the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 ("FSIA") exception for state sponsors of
terrorism, 95 and the Anti-Terrorism Act of I987, 96 are all, to quote Beth
Stephens, "clearly creatures of U.S. law, 9 7 and a U.S. court would
therefore look to domestic law to define the elements of accomplice
liability unless otherwise provided by Congress. 8 Currently, the
international law of aiding and abetting closely resembles the domestic
tort law standard found in section 876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, rendering this a distinction without a difference." However, if
international and domestic law evolve in different directions, it is
possible that the standard for accomplice liability under the ATS will be
different from that applied under these other statutes. This is the
inevitable result of the difference between a statute that provides federal
jurisdiction for certain international law violations, on the one hand, and
statutes that themselves create federal causes of action, on the other.'

92. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 966 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring),
vacated, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
93. See id. at 964.
94. Pub. L. No. 102-256, Io6 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 135o nt. (2006)).
95. 28 U.S.C. § I6o5(a)(7)(A) (2006).
96. 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2oo6).
97. Beth Stephens, Translating Filhrtiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of
Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. , to (2oo2).
Stephens also indicates that "[t]he legal regime governing the ATCA differs significantly" from these
three statutes. Id.
98. For example, the FS1A expropriation exception explicitly invokes international law by
permitting actions against sovereigns for cases involving "rights in property taken in violation of
international law." See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2oo6).
99. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 948 n.23 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, 395 F.3d 978
(9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the international criminal law standard for aiding and abetting is
similar to the domestic tort law standard found in § 876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
ioo. See also Sebok, supra note 8, at 892-93 (identifying an "alignment problem" created by using
municipal tort law to address international atrocities).
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Despite this possible future divergence in applicable standards under
the ATS compared to other domestic statutes, it is preferable to anchor
choice of law decisions in the ATS context in a principled distinction
between rules regulating behavior and rules regulating other aspects of
the legal process. Defining what conduct amounts to culpable assistance
to an international wrong belongs to the former category, and is thus
appropriately determined with reference to international law. Notably,
from the perspective of international tribunals, the prohibition on aiding
and abetting is a substantive, conduct-regulating norm governed by
customary international law.'' The task, of course, is to identify the
governing international law standard correctly in the absence of a system
of binding international precedent.
In ATS cases, the choice comes down to a standard that imposes
accomplice liability only on those who provide assistance with the
specific intent of facilitating the underlying violation (which defendants
argue represents the applicable international law standard), versus a
standard that imposes accomplice liability on those who provide
assistance knowing that the principal intends to violate international law
and whose assistance has a substantial effect on the commission of the
violation (which plaintiffs argue represents the applicable domestic law
standard or, in the alternative, the applicable international law standard).
In the South African apartheid cases, two out of three judges found it
appropriate to look to international law on the question of accomplice
liability at the motion to dismiss stage, although they disagreed about
how to frame this inquiry. Although both Judge Katzmann and Judge
Korman indicated that they were attempting to identify the
contemporary customary international law standard for accomplice
liability,' 2 they relied primarily on the decision with respect to one
defendant in the post-World War II Ministries case and on Article 25 of
the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court,'" rather than on
ioi. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/I, Trial Chamber Judgment, 191 (Dec. o,
666 (May 7, 1997).
Nonsubstantive norms, derived from the "inherent power" of the court, include, for example, the
power to hold individuals in contempt. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-9 4 -1-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment, 14 (Jan. 31, 2000) (finding the power to hold individuals in contempt even
though "[t]here is no specific customary international law directly applicable to this issue").
102. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 270 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J.,
concurring) ("[Tihe recognition of the individual responsibility of a defendant who aids and abets a
violation of international law is one of those rules 'that States universally abide by, or accede to, out of
a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern."' (citation omitted)); id. at 333 (Korman, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with Judge Katzmann that the Rome Statute "reflects an
international consensus on the issue of the appropriate standard for determining liability for aidingand-abetting").
103. Id. at 275-76 (Katzmann, J., concurring); id. at 333 (Korman, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). It is worth noting that both of these judges rejected the argument that there is no
identifiable standard for accessorial liability in customary international law. Id. at 270 (Katzmann, J.,
1998); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
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other authoritative international law sources. Broadly speaking, the two
judges who looked to international law to define the elements of
accomplice liability looked in the right direction, but they did so with
distorted lenses, leading to the incorrect conclusion that an accomplice to
an international law violation must provide assistance for the "purpose"
of facilitating that violation.' 4 The Second Circuit's decision in the
apartheid cases thus failed to provide an accurate guide for judges
grappling with allegations of accomplice liability in ATS cases.
Below, I attempt to provide more accurate guidance. First, I briefly
discuss the methodology for identifying applicable international rules. I
then examine the debate between the purpose and knowledge standards
and conclude that the knowledge standard most accurately reflects the
current state of customary international law, and should therefore be
applied in ATS cases.
i. Identifying InternationalRules
Ascertaining the content of international legal rules often begins
with reference to Article 38 of the Statute for the International Court of
Justice, which enumerates the sources of law that the ICJ uses in
adjudicating disputes between states: (a) international conventions
recognized by the contesting states; (b) "international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law"; (c) "general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations"; and (d) as a subsidiary source,
"judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations.' ' .5 Treaty rules (Art. 38(a)) are
contractual obligations among states parties. °6 Customary rules (Art.
38(b)), although they might overlap with treaty obligations, are binding
rules that develop through the accumulation of state behavior, including
the articulation of beliefs about the legal status of that behavior."°
concurring); id. at 333 (Korman, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part). All three judges
proceeded on the assumption that aiding and abetting an international law violation can give rise to
liability under the ATS in at least some circumstances, although Judge Korman would construe this
possibility quite narrowly. Compare id. at 327-28 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), with id.at 288 n.5 (Hall, J., concurring). They therefore rejected the blanket assertion that the
ATS's "refer[ence] to torts 'committed' in violation of international law" itself precludes liability for
aiding and abetting in any circumstances. See Bradley et al., supra note 19, at 926 (arguing this point).
104. Kevin Jon Heller made a similar point shortly after the decision was issued. See Posting of
Kevin Jon Heller to Opinio Juris, The Second Circuit's Incorrect Interpretation of Customary

International

Law,

http://opiniojuris.org/20077/1025/the-second-circuits-incorrect-interpretation-f-

customary-international-law-updated/ (Oct. 25, 2007, 21:3o EDT).

105. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055.
io6. Id. art. 38(a); see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FoREICN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 301 (1987) (defining "international agreement" as "an agreement between two or more states
or international organizations that is intended to be legally binding and is governed by international
law").
107. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(b); see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrITD STATES § 102(2)-(3) (defining customary international law and
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Civil actions for violations of the "law of nations" prong of the ATS
are generally understood as actions for violations of customary
international law. In addition to surveying state practice directly, judges
can look to judicial decisions and scholarly writings as useful reference
guides to customary international law, as envisioned by Article 38(d).
Although Article 38(d) specifically enumerates national judicial
decisions, domestic and international judges can also draw from a
growing body of decisions by international tribunals in a variety of areas
as evidence of customary international law. ' 8 International decisions
include judgments rendered in international criminal trials, including
those conducted by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
under the London Charter, the allied tribunals operating under Control
Council Law No. io,the ICTY, and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR)."
The same sources that help judges identify customary international
law violations can help judges identify what modes of participation give
rise to liability for those violations. For example, following the
Nuremberg Trials, the International Law Commission, which is charged
with developing and codifying international law, formulated a list of socalled "Nuremberg Principles," which were endorsed by the U.N.
General Assembly."0 The Nuremberg Principles identify crimes that,
according to the Nuremberg Charter and judgment, give rise to
"responsibility under international law ....
Principle VII explicitly states:
"Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a
crime against humanity.., is a crime under international law ....As
its relationship to treaty law).
io8. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 103(2)(a )
& cmt. b ("[T]o the extent that decisions of international tribunals adjudicate questions of
international law, they are persuasive evidence of what the law is.").
to9. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. I, Oct. 6, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82
U.N.T.S. 279; Control Council Law No. to: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes
Against Peace and Against Humanity, art. III, Dec. 20, 1945; Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993);
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, Annex, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). For a recent analysis of role of the Nuremberg Trials in ATS litigation, see
Gwynne Skinner, Nuremberg's Legacy Continues: The Nuremberg Trials' Influence on Human Rights
Litigation in U.S. Courts Under the Alien Tort Statute, 7 ALB. L. REV. 321 (2008).
Ito. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the
Nfirnberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95 (I), at 188, U.N. Doc. A/236 (Dec. 1I, 1946) [hereinafter Affirmation
of the Principles].
ii i. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, Principles of InternationalLaw Recognized in
the Charter of the Ndrnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 5 GAOR Supp. (No. 12)
126-127, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in [19501 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 377-78 [hereinafter
Ntirnberg Principles]; Affirmation of the Principles, supra note IIo.
I12. Nuirnberg Principles, supra note III. Although the prosecutor can bring a specific charge of
"complicity in genocide" before the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the term "complicity"
refers more generally to criminal participation as an accomplice, rather than a principal. See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR- 9 6-13-A, Trial Chamber Judgment,

176-177 (Jan. 27, 2000)
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elaborated below, this principle is now firmly entrenched in international
criminal law, which can appropriately be invoked by U.S. judges seeking
to identify applicable international law standards under the ATS.
The United States, in an amicus brief to the Second Circuit in the
apartheid cases, agreed that "the concept of criminal aiding and abetting
liability is well established" in international law."3 However, in this brief,
the United States attempted to resurrect the position rejected by Sosa
that the ATS cannot recognize a violation of the law of nations where
international law itself does not provide a "specific private right to
redress" for an international wrong." 4 This attempt to prevent principles
of aiding and abetting liability elaborated in the context of international
criminal law from having any value as evidence of customary
international law in the ATS context ignores the legal framework of the
ATS.
International criminal trials constitute an important source of
evidence of what behavior is considered internationally wrongful, not
only for the purpose of international criminal prosecutions, but also for
domestic proceedings designed to impose either criminal or civil
penalties for international wrongs."5 The sharp distinction between civil
and criminal proceedings and penalties is a feature identified with
' 6
modern common law systems, not the international system as a whole.
Even within common law systems, torts were historically considered the
civil counterparts of crimes." 7 The early common law did not view torts
(noting that, in most Civil Law systems, complicity includes "complicity by instigation, complicity by
aiding and abetting, and complicity by procuring means," and that in Common Law systems,
complicity includes "'aiding and abetting, counselling and procuring' (citation omitted)).
113. Brief of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellees at
21, Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) Nos. 05-2141-cv, 05-2326-cv.
114. Id. It is worth noting that the United States has criminalized torture, 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2oo6),
war crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2oo6), and genocide, 18 U.S.C. § IO9i (2006 & Supp. i 2007), as well as
complicity in those acts, 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2oo6). On June 24, 2008, the U.S. Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law held a hearing on "From Nuremberg to Darfur:
Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity" to address criminalizing crimes against humanity under
U.S. law. From Nuremberg to Darfur: Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity: Hearing before
Subcomm. On Human Rights and the Law, I loth Cong. (2oo8), availableat http://judiciary.senate.gov/
hearings/hearing.cfm?id=3432.
115. Judge Katzmann endorsed this approach, observing that "our case law.., has consistently
relied on criminal law norms in establishing the content of customary international law for purposes of
the ATCA." Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 270 n.5 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (rejecting distinction between
civil and criminal aiding and abetting liability emphasized in United States amicus brief).
116. Justice Breyer highlighted this general point in his concurrence in Sosa, citing an amicus
curiae brief submitted by the European Commission. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762-63
(2004) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[Tihe criminal courts of many nations combine civil and criminal
proceedings, allowing those injured by criminal conduct to be represented, and to recover damages, in
the criminal proceeding itself." (citation omitted)).
117. See OLVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 44 (I88I) ("[T]he general principles of
criminal and civil liability are the same."); JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF ENGLAND 2 (1863) (stating that nearly every crime is not only a crime, but is also an individual
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and crimes as different kinds of wrongful acts, but instead distinguished
torts from crimes based on the victim's choice to pursue "compensation
over vengeance.""18 The First Congress appears to have shared this
understanding since, as William Dodge emphasizes, "[t]here were two
ways to redress offenses against the law of nations: punishing the
wrongdoer and making the injured party whole.''. Sections 9 and r I of
the 1789 Judiciary Act gave the federal courts jurisdiction over commonlaw crimes, including crimes in violation of the law of nations, and the
ATS gave the district courts jurisdiction "over suits for damages based
on the same violations ..... Anne-Marie Slaughter has also pointed out
that, in the ATS context, "[a] tort is the civil analogue to a crime ..... The
fact that international criminal trials impose criminal rather than civil
sanctions for internationally wrongful conduct does not undermine their
importance as evidence of the current state of customary international
law. If anything, one might expect a criminal standard for aiding and
abetting to be defined more narrowly than a civil standard, because the
penalties are viewed as more severe."'
2.
The PurposefulnessTest
In his concurring opinion in Khulumani,Judge Katzmann sets out to
determine "whether there is a discernable core definition [of accessorial
liability] that commands the same level of consensus as the eighteenthcentury crimes identified by the Supreme Court in Sosa.'..3 He therefore
accepts what Sosa does not decide: that federal courts do not have
subject matter jurisdiction over claims for accomplice liability unless
acting as an accomplice itself violates international law. He states, "I
believe that we most effectively maintain the appropriate scope of [ATS]
jurisdiction by requiring that the specific conduct allegedly committed by

wrong or tort).
118. David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law, 76 B.U.
L. REV. 59, 6o (1996); see also id. at 59 ("In most instances, the same wrong could be prosecuted either
as a crime or as a tort."); id. at 83 ("Crime and tort were different ways for a victim to pursue justice
for the same wrongful act.").
i19. Dodge, supra note 18, at 228.
120. Id. at 231; see also Burley, supra note 57, at 478 ("Although the federal judiciary soon lost this
power with respect to crimes, its authority with respect to torts remained unchallenged.").
121. Burley, supra note 57, at 479; see also id. ("Eighteenth-century lawyers understood ['tort'] to
mean a delictual rather than a contractual wrong.").
122. The higher mens rea for criminal aiding and abetting liability appears, for example, in U.S.
federal law, even though criminal defendants generally enjoy greater protections than civil defendants.
See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 181 (1994) (identifying
federal criminal aiding and abetting liability as requiring providing assistance "with the intent to
facilitate the crime," and federal civil aiding and abetting liability as requiring providing assistance
"'know[ing] that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty' (citing RESrATEMEN-r (SECONO) OF
TORTS § 876(b) (1965))).
123. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3 d 254, 277 n.12 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J.,
concurring).
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the defendants sued represents a violation of international law.' 24
However, in surveying the available international evidence, Judge
Katzmann chooses to adopt the restrictive standard of purposeful
assistance, rather than the customary international law standard of
knowing assistance with a substantial effect.
Judge Katzmann begins with the premise that "just doing business"
in a country governed by an oppressive regime does not by itself incur
legal consequences.' 5 He cites the Furundzija opinion from the ICTY,
which surveys international judicial decisions on the standard for
accomplice liability in order to identify the applicable customary
international law standard. He acknowledges that "the recognition of
aiding and abetting liability in the ICTY Statute is particularly significant
because the 'Individual Criminal Responsibility' section of that statute
was intended to codify existing norms of customary international law."' 27
However, instead of relying on ICTY jurisprudence and the weight of
authority from cases decided under the London Charter and Control
Council Law No. io, Judge Katzmann and his colleague Judge Korman
rely instead on the Rome Statute, an international treaty creating the
first permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). I25 Judge Katzmann

acknowledges that the Rome Statute "has yet to be construed by the
International Criminal Court; its precise contours and the extent to
which it may differ from customary international law thus remain
somewhat uncertain."'' 9 Nevertheless, he adopts the Rome Statute's
articulation of the mens rea for aiding and abetting instead of the
ICTY's, although he adopts the ICTY's actus reus of providing

124. Id. at 269.
125. Accordingly, certain plaintiffs in the apartheid cases sought leave to amend their complaints
to show that "their ATCA claims were not based upon the corporations 'merely doing business' in
South Africa." Id. at 259 n.5.
126. Id. at 273 (citing Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-I7/1, Trial Chamber Judgment,
195-225, 236-240 (Dec. 1o, 1998)).
127. Id. at 274; see also id. at 274-75 (noting that "the provision of aiding and abetting liability in
the ICITY statute reflects a determination by both the Secretary-General and the Security Council,
which approved the Secretary-General's report when it enacted the statute, that such liability is firmly
established in customary international law" and that "[t]he inclusion of substantively identical
language in the statute creating the ICTR presumably reflects a similar determination").
128. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 9o
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. The International Criminal Court (ICC), unlike the ad hoc tribunals, is
the product of multilateral treaty negotiations concluded at Rome in 1998. See United Nations
Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm
(last visited Nov. 13, 2008). The ICC officially came into existence on July 1, 2002, after 6o states had
ratified the statute. See International Criminal Court: Establishment of the Court, http://www.icccpi.int/about/ataglance/establishment.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2oo8). Although several cases are
currently pending before the ICC, none has been tried to completion, meaning that there is not yet a
body of jurisprudence from the ICC authoritatively interpreting and applying the provisions of the
Rome Statute.
129. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 275-76 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
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"substantial assistance" because the Rome Statute is silent on the actus
reus requirement.'
According to Article 25 of the Rome Statute, a person "shall be
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime" if that
person "[f]or the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime,
aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted
commission, including providing the means for its commission."' 3 ' Article
lo in Part II of the Rome Statute on Jurisdiction, Admissibility and
Applicable Law cautions that its provisions should not be read to limit
customary international law: "Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as
limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of
international law for purposes other than this Statute.' 3 2 This principle
should also inform reference to other provisions in the Statute, including
Article 25, which appears in Part III on General Principles of Criminal
Law. Although the Rome Statute, along with its interpretation and its
application by the ICC, will constitute important evidence of state
practice and opinio juris for the purpose of identifying customary
international law norms, they are not dispositive and do not override the
cumulative weight of other evidentiary sources.
States parties voluntarily subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the
ICC which, unlike national courts, does not recognize a defense of
official immunity.'33 The lack of an immunity defense suggests that, in
negotiating the substantive terms of the Rome Statute, states might have
set the bar to criminal liability higher than the current state of customary
international law, which the Rome Statute does not purport to reflect. In
addition, the definition of purposeful assistance in Article 25 remains
somewhat ambiguous. States apparently failed to agree on the language
of Article 25 until the final drafting conference for the Rome Statute,
and the precise meaning of the "purpose" language has yet to be
construed by the ICC itself.'34 It remains unclear whether "purpose"
means sole purpose, primary purpose, or simply purpose as inferred from
knowledge of likely consequences. 35 Thus, although the Rome Statute
has been ratified by io8 states' 36 it cannot yet be said to reflect a
meaningful or well-defined consensus on the contours of accomplice

130. Id. at 277.
131. Rome Statute, supra note 128, art. 25(3)(c).

132. Id. art. to.
133. Id. art. 27. The availability of official immunity in national court proceedings, including ATS
cases, is beyond the scope of this Article.
134. See Cassel, supra note 4, at 310.
135. See id. at 312.
136. International Criminal Court: The States Parties to the Rome Statute, http://www.icc-cpi.int/
statesparties.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
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liability, in contrast to the greater weight of existing international
criminal jurisprudence on this question.
As both Judge Katzmann and Judge Korman recognize, Article 25
also provides for individual criminal responsibility for a person who "[i]n
any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission"
of a crime "by a group of persons acting with a common purpose," where
the person acts intentionally and has either the "aim of furthering" the
criminal purpose of the group or "knowledge of the intention of the
group to commit the crime.""'3 But they implicitly assume that the
violations at issue in ATS cases do not fall within this provision, because
they reject the knowledge standard. Instead, they find support in Article
25 for the proposition that, notwithstanding decades of international case
law to the contrary, accomplice liability requires action "for the purpose
of facilitating" the crime."" They buttress this interpretation by
emphasizing the one post-World War II case that found a banker's
knowledge of a borrower's intention to use the borrowed funds to violate
international law
insufficient to hold the banker liable for complicity in
39
the violations.

Identifying customary international law requires weighing trends in
state practice and opinio juris alongside practices and opinio juris that
appear to deviate from these trends.'4 ° However, it is a mistake to equate
customary international law-and even the Sosa standard-with
prohibiting the recognition of any rule that exceeds a lowest common
denominator of agreement in all circumstances, including a treaty in
which states parties have explicitly foregone an immunity defense for
their own officials. In adopting an excessively cautious approach to
identifying international law standards for accomplice liability, Judge
Katzmann and Judge Korman enable corporations to argue that they
should not be found civilly liable for providing substantial assistance to
an international law violation because they did not intend to facilitate
any crime, but only to increase their profits. This is not the appropriate
137. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3 d 254, 275 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J.,
concurring) (quoting Rome Statute, supra note 128, art. 25( 3 )(d)); id. at 332 (Korman, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Rome Statute, supra note 128, art. 25 ( 3 )(d)); see also Andrea
Reggio, Aiding and Abetting in International Criminal Law: The Responsibility of CorporateAgents
and Businessmen for "Trading with the Enemy" of Mankind, 5 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 623, 647 (2005)
("[U]nder the ICC Statute, while intent is required to aid and abet a crime committed by a single
person (or a plurality of persons not forming a joint criminal enterprise), knowledge is sufficient to aid
and abet a joint criminal enterprise.").
138. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 277 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 276 (quoting United States v. von Weizsaecker, 14 NUERNBERG TRIALS, supra note 42, at
308, 622); id. at 333 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing von Weizaecker, i4
NUERNBERG TRIALS, supra note 42, at 622).
140. See, e.g., FilArtiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 n.15 (2d Cir. i98o) ("The fact that the

prohibition of torture is often honored in the breach does not diminish its binding effect as a norm of
international law.").

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6o:6I

conclusion to draw from the available evidence, which I describe more
fully below.
3. The Knowledge Plus SubstantialEffect Test
The most legally sound opinion on the question of accomplice
liability has yet to be written: one that identifies international law as the
appropriate source for defining accomplice liability under the ATS, and
that correctly defines aiding and abetting as providing assistance that had
a substantial effect on the commission of the underlying violation, with
knowledge that these acts assist or facilitate the commission of the
violation. This standard flows from post-World War II and
contemporary international criminal jurisprudence, which I examine
below. Although Judge Katzmann referred to the Rome Statute as
"international legislation,"' '4' law-making processes in the international
system are polycentric, with the United Nations Security Council having
the final word in principle if not always in practice. Treaties such as the
Rome Statute provide evidence of voluntary undertakings that states
parties to the treaty agree will be legally binding amongst themselves.
Identifying international law standards thus involves consulting multiple
sources, as Article 38 of the ICJ Statute provides.
Because international jurisprudence is not itself jurisgenerative,
judges relying on international judicial decisions as evidence of
customary international law should remain aware of critiques of those
decisions and take other evidence of state practice and opinio juris into
account. Where collecting such evidence first-hand proves unwieldy,
expert affidavits, as well as international law scholarship, can be helpful,
although not determinative. Although this process might seem imperfect,
it is not unworkable. In this section, I examine several key international
decisions in some detail to illustrate the solid foundations of the
knowledge plus substantial assistance standard for accomplice liability.
The weight of post-World War II jurisprudence confirms that the
accepted mens rea for accomplice liability in international crimes is one
of knowledge of the perpetrator's criminal intent, not shared purpose. 4
For example, the Zyklon B case tried by a British Military Court at
Hamburg in 1946 provides useful evidence of postwar definitions of the
mens rea and actus reus required to establish accomplice liability for
international crimes. Three defendants were accused of knowingly
supplying poison gas that was used to execute allied nationals detained in
concentration camps: Bruno Tesch, the sole owner of the firm Tesch and
Stabenow; Karl Weinbacher, Tesch's "procurist," who was authorized to
act on behalf of the firm and administered the firm in Tesch's absence;
141. Khulumani, 504 F-3 d at 275 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
142. See, e.g., Reggio, supra note 137, at 631 (citing the Flick, LG. Farben, Krupp, Zyklon B, and
Roechling cases).
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and Joachim Drosihn, the firm's lead gassing technician, who did not
have any management responsibilities. 43 Tesch and Stabenow accepted
and processed orders for Zyklon B, which were then shipped directly
from the manufacturers to the customers-the SS concentration camps.'"
The prosecution argued, and the court agreed, that "knowingly to supply
a commodity to a branch of the State which was using that commodity
for the mass extermination of Allied civilian nationals was a war
crime."'45 Although other employees of the firm became aware of how
Zyklon B was being used, only the three senior members of the firm
were tried as war criminals.' The court convicted Tesch and Weinbacher
and sentenced them to death by hanging.'47 Drosihn was acquitted.' The
convictions were based on the defendants' knowledge of the intended
use of Zyklon B for the criminal purpose of mass extermination, and
their provision of assistance that had a substantial effect on the
commission of the crime.'49
An acknowledged exception to the knowledge standard in postWorld War II case law arose in United States v. von Weizsaecker, the socalled Ministries Case.'50 There, Karl Rasche, the Chairman of Dresdner
Bank, was acquitted of complicity in forced labor for loaning money to
SS enterprises, even though he knew these enterprises used the labor of
concentration camp inmates.'5 ' (He was convicted on other charges.' 52) It
is difficult to reconcile this result with the concurrent verdict in the trial
of banker Emil Puhl, which is more consistent with other postwar cases.
Puhl, deputy to the president of the German Reichsbank, knowingly
took part in disposing of gold (including gold teeth and crowns) and
other valuables looted from Holocaust victims.' 3 He was sentenced to
five years' imprisonment for his accessorial role in crimes against
humanity, ' even though he apparently did not share the intent of the
Nazi perpetrators and in all likelihood found their actions "repugnant."'5 5
It would be wrong to cite The Ministries Case in support of a blanket
"purpose" requirement for accomplice liability in international law. But
it is clear that, in the Rasche case, the judges found that holding a banker
143. See The Zyklon B Case (Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others), I LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF
93, 93-107 (1997) (Brit. Mil. Ct., 1946).
L44. Id.at 94145. Id. at 102.

WAR CRIMINALS

146. Id. at93, 95.
147. Id. at 102.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 94, tOO.
I5o. United States v. von Weizsaecker, 14 NUERNBERG TRIALS, supra note 42, at 3o8.
151. Id. at 622, 854; see also Ramasastry, supranote 42, at 414-17 (discussing Rasche verdict).
152. Ramasastry, supra note 42, at 414-15 (discussing Rasche verdict).
153. Von Weizsaecker, 14 NUERNBERG TRIALS, supra note 42, at 620-21.

154. Id. at 868.
155. Id. at 62o-21; see also Ramasastry, supra note 42, at 417-I8 (discussing Puhl verdict).
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liable for lending money to illegal businesses would be casting the net too
wide. Perhaps the different results in the Rasche and Puhl cases reflect
the judges' view that banks routinely lend money, whereas they
presumably do not routinely launder gold teeth, making the latter
conduct seem more egregious and worthy of criminal punishment.'
Although further investigation would be required to substantiate this
hypothesis, it is possible that the mixed verdict in the Rasche case also
reflects the challenges of branding too many prominent members of
society as war criminals in the midst of efforts at postwar reconstruction
and attempts to legitimize a transitional regime in the eyes of the public.
Building on the post-World War II cases, the ad hoc international
criminal tribunals have found that an aider and abettor must have
knowledge of the perpetrator's criminal intent, but need not share that
intent."' Unlike the Special Court for Sierra Leone (as mandated by
statute)' 5 and the International Criminal Court (in practice if not by
statute), the ad hoc tribunals are not mandated only to try those with the
greatest responsibility for international crimes.'59 Recognizing that
"system crimes," as international crimes are often called, require the
participation of numerous individuals, the ad hoc tribunals have followed
post-World War II case law in attributing responsibility on all points
along the spectrum of operational control and personal culpability. The
various modes of participation in international crimes all incur individual
156. Compare von Weizsaecker, 14 NUERNBERG TRIALS, supra note 42, at 622 (reasoning with
respect to Rasche that "[a] bank sells money or credit in the same manner as the merchandiser of any
other commodity. It does not become a partner in enterprise, and the interest charged is merely the
gross profit which the bank realizes from the transaction, out of which it must deduct its business costs,
and from which it hopes to realize a net profit"), with id. at 621 (reasoning with respect to Puhl that
"[i]t would be a strange doctrine indeed, if, where part of the plan and one of the objectives of murder
was to obtain the property of the victim, even to the extent of using the hair from his head and the
gold of his mouth, he who knowingly took part in disposing of the loot must be exonerated and held
not guilty as a participant in the murder plan").
157. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-I7/I-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
245249 (Dec. io, 1998) (identifying mens rea requirement of knowledge); Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case
No. ICrR-95-IA-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 32 (June 7, 2OOl) (identifying mens rea requirement
of knowledge); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 538 (Sept.
2, 1998) (indicating that, with respect to the crime of complicity in genocide, the accomplice must have
acted knowingly). But cf id. at 485 (suggesting that aiding and abetting genocide, rather than
complicity in genocide, require that the aider and abettor share the principal's specific genocidal
intent); Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-3o/I-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 262 (Nov. 2, 2001)
(indicating that, because persecution is a "special intent" crime, the aider and abettor "must also be
aware that the crimes being assisted or supported are committed with a discriminatory intent" but
"does not need to share the discriminatory intent").
158. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. i(i), S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/13 15
(Aug. 14, 2ooo), available at http://www.sc-sl.orgfDocuments/scsl-statute.html (last visited Nov. 13,
2oo8).
159. For example, the ICTY's first verdict was against defendant Drazen Erdemovic, a young
soldier in the Bosnian Serb army who pleaded guilty to obeying an order to execute hundreds of
Muslims. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment (Nov. 29, 1996).
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criminal responsibility, although they may attract different degrees of
opprobrium."
Article 7(0) of the ICTY Statute, which is identical to Article 6(1) of
the ICTR Statute, provides: "A person who planned, instigated, ordered,
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation
or execution of a crime... shall be individually responsible for the
crime.' ', 6 ' The requirements for liability for committing a crime as a
principal, and liability as an aider and abettor, can be charted as follows:

CoMMIrrING/
PERPETRATING

AIDING AND ABETrING

Acrus REUS
Participating directly in the
material elements of the
offense through positive
acts or omissions.

Providing practical
assistance, encouragement,
or moral support that has a
substantial effect on the
perpetration of the
offense. ' 64

MENS REA

Acting in the awareness of
the substantial likelihood
that a criminal act or
omission would occur as a
consequence of one's
conduct. 6' '
Knowing that the acts assist
or facilitate the commission
of the offense.' 6'

16o. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-9 8- 3 o/I-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 92
(Feb. 28, 2005) ("Aiding and abetting generally involves a lesser degree of individual criminal
responsibility than co-perpetration in a joint criminal enterprise."). This differs from U.S. criminal law,
which treats accomplices as if they had actually perpetrated the crime. See, e.g., i8 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2006)
("Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces
or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal."); Joshua Dressier, Reassessingthe Theoretical
Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem,37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 92 n.3
(1985) ("Crimes are defined as if the accomplice actually committed the acts that constitute the
offense.").
161. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827,
Annex art. 7(I), U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, Annex art. 6(i), U.N. Doc. S/RES/95 5 (Nov. 8, 1994). A separate article,
Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute and Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute, defines the elements of
command responsibility, which is separate from accomplice liability and is generally not at issue in
corporate ATS cases. The international law doctrine of command responsibility, which has been
applied in ATS cases, holds commanders and superiors liable for violating an independent duty to
prevent or punish violations. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 84, at 257 ("U.S. decisions look to case
law of international tribunals to define the scope of command responsibility.").
162. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-3o/i-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 251 (Nov.
2,2001).

163. Id.
164. Id. 253.
165. Id.
253, 255 ("[T]he aider or abettor must have intended to assist or facilitate, or at least
have accepted that such a commission of a crime would be a possible and foreseeable consequence of
his conduct.").
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The ICTY Trial Chamber's opinion in Prosecutor v. Furundzija
considers the elements of aiding and abetting liability under customary
international law at some length and merits attention here.'6 U.S. judges6
in ATS cases, including Judge Pregerson for the majority in Unocal,''
have relied on this opinion as evidence of the content of customary
international law. It is worth reviewing the details of the Furundzijacase
because the possibility that "moral support" could constitute the actus
reus for accomplice liability represented a major sticking point for Judge
Reinhardt in the choice
between international law and federal common
6
law under the ATS.' 8
The ICTY's discussion centers on Furundzija's presence during the
sexual assault and rape of a detained civilian, referred to in the opinion
as "Witness A.'', 69 Furundzija was a local commander of a special unit of
the military police known as the Jokers."7 ° While Furundzija interrogated
Witness A, another soldier forced Witness A to undress and rubbed his
knife along her inner thigh and lower stomach, threatening to put his
knife in her vagina if she did not tell the truth. 7 ' Later, while Furundzija
interrogated Witness A and another victim, the same soldier beat the
victims on their feet with a baton and then forced Witness A to have oral
and vaginal intercourse with him.'72 The trial chamber examined
customary international law to establish "both whether the accused's
alleged presence in the locations where Witness A was assaulted would
be sufficient to constitute the actus reus of aiding and abetting, and also
the relevant mens rea required to accompany this action for
responsibility to ensue.

'

Because of the facts presented by this case, it was important for the
tribunal to establish first whether assistance must be "tangible" in order
to satisfy the actus reus of aiding and abetting.'74 The tribunal found,
based on a survey of post-World War II case law, that "in certain
circumstances, aiding and abetting need not be tangible, but may consist
of moral support or encouragement of the principals in their commission
166. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT- 9 5 -I7/I-T, Trial Chamber Opinion and Judgment (Dec.
io, 1998).

167. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F. 3 d 932, 950-51 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, 395 F.3d 978 ( 9 th Cir.
2003). Judge Pregerson's opinion also analogizes Unocal to the defendants in post-World War II
Nuremberg trials. Id. at 948 n.22 ("Unocal thus resembles the defendants in [United States v.] Krupp,
who 'well knew that any expansion [of their business] would require the employment of forced labor,'
and the defendants in United States v. Flick, who sought to increase their production quota and thus
their forced labor allocation." (citations omitted)).
168. See id. at 969-70 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
169. Furundzija, Case No. IT-9 5 -17/I-T, Trial Chamber Opinion and Judgment, T 39.
170. Id.
39-40.
171. Id. 4 0.

172. Id. 4.
173. Id. ' 191.
174. Id. 19q.
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of the crime."' 75 For example, the tribunal cited the Synagogue case,
which was heard under Control Council Law No. io, for the proposition
that "an approving spectator who is held in such respect by the other
perpetrators that his presence encourages them in their conduct, may be
guilty of complicity in a crime against humanity."'' 6 The tribunal
concluded that "presence, when combined with authority, can constitute
assistance in the form of moral support, that is, the actus reus of the
offence." '77 The emphasis on presence and authority was central to the
tribunal's holding that moral support can, in some circumstances, satisfy
the actus reus requirement of aiding and abetting.7
The tribunal also made clear that the defendant's acts or omissions
must have a "substantial effect on the commission of the offence."' 7 9 This
does not amount to a requirement of "but for" causation. But it does
tend to exonerate those whose contributions, although instrumental and
made with knowledge of the principal's criminal intent, do not play a
sufficiently large enabling role in the principal's offense.'"
Given the ICTY's numerous qualifying statements in the Furundzija
opinion, it is somewhat surprising to see that, in Unocal, Judge Reinhardt
rejected ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence as authoritative guides to
accomplice liability standards under the ATS in no small part because of
the possibility that "moral support" might satisfy the actus reus
requirement for aiding and abetting.'8 ' Judge Pregerson, who looked to
international law to supply the elements of aiding and abetting liability,
found the Furundzija court's review of post-World War II case law
persuasive in identifying customary international law norms."s2 He
adopted the Furundzijacourt's approach to aiding and abetting liability,
175. Id.
176. Id.

207 (citing Strafsenat. Urteil vom so. Aug. 1948 gegen K. und A. StS 18/48, i

ENTSCHEIDUNGEN

177. Id.

IN STRAFSACHEN

53, 56 (1949)).

209.

178. See id.(finding that "[tihe supporter must be of a certain status for" assistance in the form of
moral support "to be sufficient for criminal responsibility"). As the Furundzija court pointed out, the
ICTR reached a similar conclusion in the trial of Jean-Paul Akayesu. Id. (citing Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR- 9 6-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 692 (Sept. 2, 1998)).
179. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/s-T, Trial Chamber Opinion and Judgment, 221.
18o. Id.
222-223 (distinguishing the guilty verdicts in the British Zyklon B case against the
owner and second-in-command of the firm that produced poison gas used in concentration camps from
the acquittal of a senior gassing technician employed by the firm). The Furundzijacourt's discussion of
the mens rea requirement for aiding and abetting is more cursory and less helpful than its discussion of
the actus reus requirement. The court ultimately found that, despite individual post-World War II
cases requiring a greater or lesser mens rea, the majority of cases indicate that knowledge suffices to
convict an aider and abettor. Id. 245. In particular, the court cited the numerous convictions of
individuals who drove victims and perpetrators to the site of an execution with knowledge of the
criminal purpose of the executioners, but without the shared intention of killing. Id.
181. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3 d 932, 969-70 ( 9 th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring),
vacated, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
182. Id. at 950-51 (majority opinion).
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but he stopped short of endorsing "moral support" as a possibly
sufficient actus reus.'8' Judge Pregerson stated: "[W]e may impose aiding
and abetting liability for knowing practical assistance or encouragement
which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime, leaving
the question whether such liability should also be imposed for-moral
support which has the required substantial effect to another day."'"
Judge Reinhardt, who looked instead to federal common law to
provide the elements of aiding and abetting liability, made much of this
apparent prevarication.'8 5 Judge Reinhardt chided:
[T]he majority disclaims an integral portion of the international law
standard it adopts, purporting to leave "to another day" the question
whether moral support alone (whatever that may mean) is sufficient to
give rise to third-party liability. However, by substituting international
law standards for federal common law, rather than following federal
common law and incorporating those portions of international law that
attract sufficient legal support, the majority has lost whatever
opportunity it had to pick and choose the aspects of international law
that it finds appealing.

This back-and-forth over the "moral support" requirement was
largely avoidable, and should not be the basis for choosing federal
common law over international law. Contrary to Judge Reinhardt's
suggestion, one need not adopt a "take it or leave it" approach to
international judicial decisions as evidence of customary international
law, provided that one has a principled basis for picking and choosing.
Judge Pregerson should have emphasized that, in order to constitute
aiding and abetting, "moral support" must be given by an approving
spectator with high status or authority, in addition to having the required
substantial effect on the commission of the crime. He could then either
have adopted the Furundzija court's articulation of the applicable
customary international law standard without modifying it,' 7 or he could
have found the contextual requirements of the "moral support" standard
inapplicable in the context of corporate complicity, and declined to
invoke the "moral support" prong of accomplice liability on that basis.
Had he chosen either of these paths, his opinion would have more
faithfully and forcefully articulated the international law definition of
accomplice liability, and provided a clearer road map for future ATS
cases.

183. Id. at 951.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 970 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
186. Id. at n.9 (citation omitted).
187. See id. at 951 (finding that "application of a slightly modified Furundzija standard is
appropriate in the present case").
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III. CHALLENGES
The doctrinal muddle surrounding ATS claims has proven
particularly acute in cases alleging corporate complicity in international
law violations by states. The Khulumani'm decision only compounded this
confusion. It remains to be seen whether appellate decisions in pending
corporate ATS cases'" evaluate complicity claims with any greater
degree of doctrinal coherence or consensus than their predecessors.
The above analysis provides a guide for evaluating complicity claims
in pending and future ATS cases. First, federal subject matter jurisdiction
over an alleged international law violation, including accomplice liability
for such a violation, must be decided with reference to international law.
This is because a defendant's mode of participation in an international
law violation can best be conceptualized as a conduct-regulating rule that
is part of the substantive violation, not an ancillary question.
Second, there is a well-accepted and specific definition of accomplice
liability in international law that supports federal subject matter
jurisdiction under the ATS. This standard defines an accomplice as one
who provides assistance that has a substantial effect on the commission
of the underlying violation, with knowledge that these acts assist or
facilitate the commission of the violation. Federal courts have subject
matter jurisdiction over ATS complaints that allege accomplice liability,
and defendants' conduct can properly be adjudicated under this wellestablished international law standard.
Any doctrinal conclusion carries policy implications. In this Part, I
briefly identify and examine some of these implications, which are bound
to inform reactions to my conclusions.
A.

INDETERMINACY

Prevailing understandings of common law as judge-made law make
contemporary jurists uncomfortable with vesting too much discretion in
federal judges to develop law in new areas."9 This anxiety is even more
acute when foreign and international law sources are involved.'9 ' The
Sosa court recognized this discomfort, which animated in part its
conclusion that actionable international law norms must reach a certain

188. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F-3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007).
189. See cases cited supra note iO.
19o. See, e.g., Jose A. Cabranes, InternationalLaw by Consent of the Governed, 42 VAL. U. L. REv.
119, 134-35 (2oo7) (discussing the problems involved in identifying customary international law and
the difficulty of separating "empirical" from "theoretical and policy-driven" international law
scholarship to assist in this endeavor).
191. For an overview of related debates in the area of constitutional interpretation, see CHIMNE I.
KEITNER, INTERNATIONAL AND FOREIGN LAW SOURCES: SIREN SONG FOR U.S. JUDGES? (Am. Const. Soc'y
for Law and Policy, 2007), available at http://www.acslaw.org/fides/Keitner%20ACS%2oissue%
2obrief.pdf.
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level of "acceptance among civilized nations," and that their content
must be no "less definite" than the historical paradigms familiar at the
time the ATS was enacted.'92 The reluctance to vest too much discretion
in federal judges seems particularly acute when, as here, judges are asked
to identify and apply customary international law. As Judge Edwards
remarked: "While [the Fildrtiga]approach is consistent with the language
of section 1350, it places an awesome duty on federal district courts to
derive from an amorphous entity-i.e., the 'law of nations'-standards of
liability applicable in concrete situations."'"
The proliferation of international criminal law jurisprudence assists
in this endeavor, but it does not negate domestic judges' "awesome
duty." That said, it is not clear that the burden of interpreting and
applying federal common law would be any less "awesome." For
example, in Khulumani, Judge Korman pointed out that using the
American Law Institute's Restatement of Torts as a touchstone for
standards of accomplice liability does not constrain judicial discretion
any more than invoking international law.'94 Although looking to a single
source such as the Restatement is practically easier than canvassing a
variety of international law sources, the flexibility of the federal common
law approach makes it no less indeterminate than the international law
approach. Moreover, as the Sosa court emphasized, Congress can act to
override international law for ATS purposes if it so chooses.'95
The indeterminacy concern can also be framed as a concern about
accuracy, rather than discretion. Simply put, U.S. courts might not
correctly identify customary international law standards. This concern
cannot be avoided entirely. Although identifying applicable international
law standards is a matter of law and not of fact, parties often submit
expert affidavits to establish the existence or absence of particular
customary international law norms. I 6 This compensates to a certain
192. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).

193. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring).
194. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 328 (2d Cir. 2007) (Korman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Cabranes articulates a similarly skeptical view of the
Restatements as a source of law. See Cabranes, supra note i9o, at 137 (characterizing the American
Law Institute's approach to identifying the "better rule" as "by definition, a political enterprise, in
which competing perspectives, personalities, and factions vie for the favorable final verdict of a selfselected elite").
195. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 ("Congress may [shut the door to the law of nations] at any time
(explicitly, or implicitly by treaties or statutes that occupy the field), just as it may modify or cancel
any judicial decision so far as it rests on recognizing an international norm as such.").
196. This practice is specifically referenced in section i13(2) of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law. For a commentary on the implications of the use of expert witnesses to prove the
content of customary international law, see Harold G. Maier, The Role of Experts in Proving
InternationalHuman Rights Law in Domestic Courts: A Commentary, 25 GA. J.INT'L & COMP. L. 205
(996).
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extent for the general lack of international law training among U.S.
judges, but the potential for error inevitably exists. Again, however, it is
also possible that a U.S. district court judge will incorrectly identify
federal common law standards. The argument that the indeterminacy of
international law should preclude its application by U.S. courts is
unpersuasive. At most, it confirms the continued need to train U.S.
lawyers and judges in comparative and international law principles and
research methods so that they are better equipped to handle
transnational cases across a variety of contexts.

B.

DELEGATION

The preference for applying domestic over international law may
also reflect concerns about the institutional constraints under which
international tribunals are operating, and the appropriateness of relying
excessively on those tribunals to identify customary international law
standards. For example, the third category of "joint criminal enterprise"
(JCE) liability identified by the ad hoc tribunals has been criticized for
implicating individuals as principals for acts committed by co-principals
beyond the object of the criminal enterprise, much like the U.S.
Pinkerton'" doctrine of conspiracy.'8 It might seem easier to put the
"brakes" on the incorporation of theories such as the third category of
JCE into ATS jurisprudence if one views modes of liability as a matter of
federal common law, rather than international law. However, the critique
of the third category of JCE itself indicates that, by reviewing both
scholarship and jurisprudence that collects evidence of state practice and
opinio juris, U.S. judges can evaluate their foreign and international
counterparts' identification of customary international law standards and
reach their own conclusions.
Applying international law can also raise concerns about delegating
the future development of conduct-regulating norms outside of the
United States. The Sosa majority seems to have contemplated such a

197. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (affirming that a defendant may be held
criminally liable for reasonably foreseeable acts of co-conspirators).
198. See, e.g., Steven Powles, Joint Criminal Enterprise- Criminal Liability by Prosecutorial
Ingenuity and Judicial Creativity?, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 606, 615 (2004) ("A closer inspection of the
authorities and practice cited in Tadic as giving rise to a customary norm of international law in
relation to the third category of joint criminal enterprise, the extended form, reveals that the
acceptance of such liability was limited."). Recently, Darryl Robinson has highlighted the internal
contradictions in the ad hoc tribunals' standard for JCE, which is easier to establish than aiding and
abetting, but which carries greater culpability. See Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of
International Criminal Law 25 n.87 (May 5, 2008) (unpublished manuscript available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=I127851). More generally, Robinson's analysis underscores the need to
distinguish the law-identifying functions of the tribunals from their law-generating pretensions. This
exercise is necessarily imperfect but, as suggested above, this imperfection does not in itself require
abandoning the attempt to identify binding international law standards. See discussion supra Part
III.A.
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delegation when it left the door ajar to recognizing future customary
international law norms, subject to "vigilant doorkeeping..'.. Although
U.S. courts are the "doorkeepers," and although the United States plays
an important role in creating customary international law through its
own state practice and expressions of opinio juris, resort to international
law does delegate some law-making power outside of the United States.
That said, the First Congress enacted the ATS in order to give federal
courts jurisdiction to adjudicate claims for certain international law
violations. It would be highly ironic if these cases were disfavored on the
grounds that they require U.S. judges to apply international law.
Even though the ATS recognizes the international community's
jurisdiction to prescribe internationally unlawful conduct, ATS
jurisprudence has itself become an important source for the
identification of international law standards. For example, U.N. Special
Representative John Ruggie cites ATS jurisprudence in documenting the
emergence of international law constraints on corporations, and
characterizes decisions in ATS cases as the "largest body of domestic
jurisprudence regarding corporate responsibility for international
crimes.""° This process exemplifies the transnational judicial dialogue
envisioned, for example, in Article 38(d) of the ICJ Statute, which
identifies national judicial decisions and scholarly writings as subsidiary
means for determining the content of customary international law. In this
perspective, delegation concerns can best be addressed through the
continued engagement of U.S. courts in the process of identifying
customary international law, which also ultimately contributes to the
law's progressive development.
C.

COMITY

Debates over the reasonableness of one country's exercise of
prescriptive, adjudicative, or enforcement jurisdiction over activities
occurring in another country persist in multiple contexts, and ATS cases
are no exception. In his concurring opinion in Sosa, Justice Breyer
addressed this issue under the heading of "comity." He stated that U.S.
federal courts should, on a case-by-case basis, "ask whether the exercise
of jurisdiction under the ATS is consistent with those notions of comity
that lead each nation to respect the sovereign rights of other nations by
limiting the reach of its laws and their enforcement. 0' Looking to
international law rather than federal common law helps alleviate this
concern. 2 Because accomplice liability is itself an international law
norm, U.S. courts can find defendant corporations liable without
199. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
200. See Business and Human Rights, supra note 9,
30.
201. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 761 (Breyer, J., concurring).
202. My thanks to Bill Dodge for emphasizing this point.
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imposing U.S. conduct-regulating rules on extraterritorial activities.
Those who seek to limit the extraterritorial reach of U.S. prescriptive
jurisdiction should favor this result, since it grounds ATS actions for
accomplice liability in international, rather than domestic, law."
Objections to perceived overreaching by U.S. courts in ATS and
other cases arguably have more to do with U.S. assertion of personal
jurisdiction over foreign corporations in a variety of contextsY4 This
should not deter U.S. judges from implementing their legislative
mandate to enforce international law standards in ATS cases, absent
other discretionary grounds for declining to exercise jurisdiction in
specific cases."0 5
Corporate defendants facing allegations of complicity in
international law violations under the ATS also argue that plaintiffs are
trying to make an impermissible end-run around the FSIA, which is the
exclusive source of U.S. adjudicative jurisdiction over foreign states.
While the spirit of the "end-run" argument seems plausible, the language
of the FSIA specifically limits its reach to "agencies and
instrumentalities" of foreign states, which does not encompass
independent corporate accomplices.2 6 To the extent that ATS complaints
seek redress for the conduct of the defendant accomplices, rather than
the sovereign principals, a strong case can be made that these civil
actions do not impermissibly infringe on the absent principal's
sovereignty.

203. To the extent that the underlying conduct also violates the domestic law of the country in
which it occurred, that country would have concurrent jurisdiction based on the territoriality principle.
Under the ATS, a defendant's alleged conduct is actionable because it violates international law.
whether or not it also violates domestic law. Some defendants argue that the ATS carries an implicit
requirement of exhaustion of local remedies, because the much more recently enacted TVPA has an
explicit exhaustion requirement. The exhaustion debate lies beyond the scope of this paper, although
it is worth noting that in many ATS cases, there are few if any local remedies available to exhaust. See,
e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 487 F.3d 1193, 1217-19 (9th Cir. 2007) (declining to find an exhaustion
requirement in the ATS), appeals docketed, Nos. 02-56256, 02-56390 (argued to en banc court on Oct.
11, 2007).

204. For example, Andrew Wilson suggests that "much of the criticism of the Act's 'overreaching'
would be more properly directed at the forms of personal jurisdiction that are used in conjunction with
it, notably 'tag' (based on the-often ephemeral-presence of defendant in the United States) and
'doing business' jurisdiction, especially in its 'general' form." Andrew J. Wilson, Beyond Unocal:
Conceptual Problems in Using InternationalNorms to Hold TransnationalCorporationsLiable Under
the Alien Tort Claims Act, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 43,44 n.4 (Olivier De
Schutter ed., 2006).
205. For example, in Khulumani, Judge Katzmann and Judge Hall agreed that prudential
considerations could indeed warrant dismissal, but they found that this was for the district court judge
to address in the first instance. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3 d 254, 261 n.8 (2d Cir.
2007). But see id. at 308 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The issue [of
deference to the Executive] here should be treated as one going to subject matter jurisdiction-which
we must resolve-even if it would not necessarily be so treated in other contexts.").
206. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-161 (20o6).
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Although accomplice liability does in some sense depend upon
wrongdoing by the principal, it can be adjudicated independent of the
principal's liability.2" The conduct being adjudicated is the defendant's,
not the principal's. The U.S. government's position in its amicus brief in
Khulumani does not sufficiently appreciate this distinction. In that brief,
the U.S. government combined the extraterritoriality argument
addressed above with a comity argument framed in terms of vicarious
liability:
It would be extraordinary to give U.S. law an extraterritorial effect in
[these] circumstances to regulate [the] conduct of a foreign state over
its citizens, and all the more so for a federal court to do so as a matter
of common law-making power. Yet plaintiffs would have this Court do
exactly that by rendering private defendants liable for the sovereign
acts of the apartheid government of South Africa.
A private actor serving as a government agent would benefit from
immunity under the FSIA. However, where there is no agency
relationship, there is no basis for depriving a U.S. court of subject matter
jurisdiction over an accessory's wrongful acts merely because the court
does not have jurisdiction over the principal.2" Moreover, precisely
because the principal's acts are non-justiciable in U.S. courts,"' the
foreign state should not be considered an indispensable party, in part
because there is little risk of a duplicative action reaching a contrary
result.
Comity and related concerns are best addressed by invoking familiar
abstention doctrines, where applicable, rather than by further muddling
the jurisdictional analysis. Although it might be tempting to dismiss a
pending ATS case at the earliest opportunity, judges should refrain from
blurring the distinction between dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, and dismissal based on a refusal to exercise jurisdiction on
prudential grounds. ' Improper dismissals for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction prevent U.S. courts from fulfilling their role as domestic
enforcers of certain well-established international law norms, a role
207. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
531
(Sept. 2, 1998) ("As far as the Chamber is aware, all criminal systems provide that an accomplice may
also be tried, even where the principal perpetrator of the crime has not been identified, or where, for
any other reasons, guilt could not be proven.").
208. Brief of the United States of America Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellees, at 21,
Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2o07) Nos. 05-241-cv, 05-2326-cv.
209. The FSIA defines an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" as an "organ of a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof" or an entity "a majority of whose shares or other ownership
interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof." 28 U.S.C. § 16o3(b)(2) (2oo6).
21o. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (providing that, subject to enumerated exceptions, "a foreign state shall
be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States").
21 1. Cf. Corrie v. Caterpillar, 5o3 F.3d 974, 979, 984 (9th Cir. 2o07) (improperly treating the
political question doctrine as jurisdictional rather than prudential, and affirming dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because suit involved a political question).
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prescribed by the First Congress and recognized by the Supreme Court
in Sosa.
CONCLUSION

ATS litigation provides a rich laboratory for examining the
interaction of international and domestic law in U.S. courts. The
elusiveness of judicial agreement on standards for adjudicating
accomplice liability in ATS cases reflects persistent confusion about the
appropriate doctrinal framework, as well as normative disagreement
about the desirability of applying international law in U.S. courts. My
doctrinal analysis indicates that international law, not federal common
law, governs the standards for accomplice liability at both the
jurisdictional and merits stages. The ATS gives federal courts jurisdiction
to hear claims for accomplice liability, which are appropriately
adjudicated by applying international law to the defendant's conduct.
Defendant accomplices may appropriately be found liable under
international law if they knowingly provide assistance that has a
substantial effect on the commission of the underlying violation. From a
normative perspective, this approach also seems most compatible with
limiting the extraterritorial reach of domestic prescriptive jurisdiction in
the ATS context while at the same time enabling domestic courts to
adjudicate and enforce international law.
U.S. judges can invoke a variety of prudential doctrines to abstain
from exercising jurisdiction under the ATS, where appropriate. By
abstaining too frequently, however, U.S. judges will deprive plaintiffs of
an opportunity to seek redress for international law violations in federal
court, a result contrary to the purpose of the First Congress. They will
also forfeit their own ability to participate meaningfully in the
development and enforcement of international law standards that are
designed to protect individuals, not just govern the interactions of states.
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